<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>UCS</title><link>/</link><atom:link href="/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><description>UCS</description><generator>Hugo Blox Builder (https://hugoblox.com)</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Tue, 18 Nov 2025 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>UCS Research Results at it-sa 2026</title><link>/post/2026-10-26-athene-at-it-sa/</link><pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2026-10-26-athene-at-it-sa/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="heading">&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>From October 27 to 29, 2026, the &lt;a href="https://www.athene-center.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE&lt;/a> participated in &lt;a href="https://www.itsa365.de/de-de/it-sa-expo-congress" target="_blank" rel="noopener">it-sa Expo&amp;amp;Congress&lt;/a> in Nuremberg, Europe&amp;rsquo;s largest trade fair for IT security. Selected recent research results were showcased, including work by &lt;a href="author/johanna-henrich">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a> from the User-Centered Security (UCS) research group as part of the ATHENE research project &lt;a href="project/saturn/">SATURN&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>With the ongoing development of powerful quantum computers, quantum-safe cryptographic methods are becoming increasingly important. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) pursue different approaches that can be combined through hybrid key exchange.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>An &lt;a href="https://qkd.ucs.h-da.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">interactive web application&lt;/a> made the research results comprehensible. Visitors were able to explore the developed hybrid key exchange protocol step by step and trigger benchmarkings. The initial version of the web service was developed as part of a Master PSE.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>UCS team member &lt;a href="author/sofiia-kurchanova/">Sofiia Kurchanova&lt;/a> supported both the preparations for the exhibition and the activities throughout the event.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In addition, Johanna Henrich hold several talks at the ATHENE booth entitled “Cryptographic Agility and Hybridization – Working Together for the Cryptography of Tomorrow.” The talks highlighted the importance of adaptable cryptographic systems and the opportunities offered by hybrid approaches for the transition to quantum-safe communication.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
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&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Johanna Henrich presenting at it-sa 2026" srcset="
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&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="athene@it-sa2026" srcset="
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&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="sofiiaujohanna@it-sa2026" srcset="
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&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="exhibit@it-sa2026" srcset="
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Image ©: Johanna Henrich
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&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Paper presented at NordiCHI 2026 in Finland</title><link>/post/2026-10-03-nordchi/</link><pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2026-10-03-nordchi/</guid><description>&lt;p>The research project PIONEER was featured at &lt;a href="https://sites.uwasa.fi/nordichi2026/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NordiCHI 2026&lt;/a>, the Nordic Conference on Human-Computer Interaction, held in Vaasa, Finland. The conference brought together researchers and practitioners from academia and industry to discuss the latest developments in areas such as user experience, artificial intelligence and digital inclusion.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>During the event, Sara Hahn presented the &lt;a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3829807.3829827" target="_blank" rel="noopener">paper &amp;ldquo;Mr. Robot to the Rescue&amp;rdquo;&lt;/a>. The talk explored how accurate depictions of cyber security in entertainment media, as portrayed in Mr. Robot, shape people&amp;rsquo;s beliefs about cyber security. The discussion with the international audience provided valuable feedback and new perspectives for the ongoing research.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The PIONEER project is part of ATHENE’s mission to advance cyber security and privacy research with practical solutions that can be transferred into real-world applications.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-sara-hahn">
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&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="NordCHI at University of Vaasa" srcset="
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&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Sara Hahn presenting at NordCHI2026" srcset="
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Image ©: Sara Hahn
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&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Decentralized Maintenance of IT Security in Distributed Systems - Enhance Crypto-Agility via Blockchain Technology</title><link>/offerings/2024-09-thesis-decentralize-crypto-agility/</link><pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2024-09-thesis-decentralize-crypto-agility/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Eines vorab: Die Motivation dieser Masterarbeit ist nicht, möglichst viele IT-Security Buzzwords in einen Titel zu packen. Es gibt tatsächlich Gründe, warum es sich lohnt, Blockchain in Verbindung mit Krypto-Agilität genauer zu untersuchen:&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Grundsätzlich werden kryptographische Verfahren und Prototokolle bei der Kommunikation zwischen IT-Systemen genutzt, um Sicherheitsziele wie Vetraulichkeit und Authentizität zu erreichen und Angriffe durch unberechtigte Dritte abzuwehren. Neue Erkenntnisse und Technologien können jedoch dazu führen, dass vermeintlich sichere Kryptographie plötzlich gebrochen werden kann. Ein aktuelles Beispiel ist die Bedrohung durch Quantencomputer, welche diverse Verfahren brechen könnten, sobald ausreichend leistungsstarke Modelle verfügbar sind.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Krypto-Agilität ist die Fähigkeit eines Systems, rasch gezielte Maßnahmen ergreifen zu können, um die Sicherheit im Ernstfall wieder herzustellen. Dazu müssen alle Teilsysteme darüber informiert sein, welche Kryptographie sie verwenden und welche als sicher angesehen wird, wobei sich die Lage fortlaufend verändert. Besonders in großen, heterogenen Systemen, die nicht zentral gemanaged werden, stellt sich die Frage, wer festlegt, was als sicher zu betrachten ist und wie diese Informationen zuverlässig verteilt werden. Die Blockchain-Technologie könnte hier von Vorteil sein, denn sie ermöglicht eine dezentrale Haltung von kontinuierlich erweiterbaren Daten.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Im Rahmen der Masterarbeit soll analysiert werden, ob die Verwendung einer Blockchain in diesem Anwendungsszenario sinnvoll sein kann. Dazu sollen systematisch verschiedene Anwendungskonzepte entworfen und gegenübergestellt werden. Für die Gegenüberstellung werden Vor- und Nachteile identifiziert, welche unter anderem den zeitlichen und materiellen Aufwand für Implementierung und Instandhaltung sowie die Fehleranfälligkeit des Systems berücksichtigen. Des Weiteren soll ein Vergleich zu anderen Lösungsansätzen in der Literatur gezogen werden, welche nicht auf die Blockchain-Technologie zurückgreifen. Bei Interesse kann die Machbarkeit anhand eines Prototypen demonstriert werden.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Literaturrecherche bzgl.
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Krypto-Agilität und Crypto-Inventories in großen, heterogenen verteilten Systemen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Anwendungskonzepte für die Blockchain&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Alternative Ansätze für eine dezentrale, kontinuierlich erweiterbare Datenhaltung&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Beschreibung von Anwendungsfällen und Ableitung von Anforderungen für die Verteilung von Informationen bzgl. zu verwendender Kryptographie&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Design von Konzepten für die Verwendung der Blockchain-Technologie auf Basis der erstellten Use Cases und Anforderungen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Identifizierung von Vor-und Nachteilen und Gegenüberstellung der Konzepte&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Optional&lt;/em>: Implementierung eines Prototyps&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse in IT-Sicherheit &amp;amp; Angewandte Kryptographie&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse in Prozessmanagement&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse in Computernetze &amp;amp; Betriebssysteme&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Spaß an der Verknüpfung von theoretischen Konzepten und Praxis&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="referenzen-und-literatur-auswahl">Referenzen und Literatur (Auswahl)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30122-3_7" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Hohm, J., Heinemann, A., Wiesmaier, A. (2023). Towards a Maturity Model for Crypto-Agility Assessment. In: Jourdan, GV., Mounier, L., Adams, C., Sèdes, F., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13877. Springer, Cham.&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://dl.gi.de/server/api/core/bitstreams/f35b7164-a5bf-4c01-81e9-2accb6d01b4a/content" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Schmitt, N., Henrich, J., Heinz, D., Alnahawi, N., Wiesmaier, A. (2024). On Criteria and Tooling for Cryptographic Inventories. In: S. Wendzel et al. (Hrsg.): SICHERHEIT 2024, Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI),Gesellschaft für Informatik, Bonn 2024&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3567825" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ott, D., Paterson, K., &amp;amp; Moreau, D. (2023). Where Is the Research on Cryptographic Transition and Agility?. Communications of the ACM, 66(4), 29-32.&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/TSC.2018.2853167" target="_blank" rel="noopener">R. Li, T. Song, B. Mei, H. Li, X. Cheng, L. Sun (2019). Blockchain for Large-Scale Internet of Things Data Storage and Protection. In: IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 762-771&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/BalkanCom55633.2022.9900867" target="_blank" rel="noopener">A. Rustemi, V. Atanasovski, A. Risteski (2022). Overview of Blockchain Data Storage and Privacy Protection. 2022 International Balkan Conference on Communications and Networking (BalkanCom), Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="beginn">Beginn&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>sofort oder nach Absprache&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Bei Interesse melden Sie sich bitte bei &lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich/">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Mr. Robot to the Rescue? Exploring How Correct Cyber Security Content in Entertainment Media Influences Cyber Security Beliefs</title><link>/publication/2026-nordchi-hahn/</link><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2026-nordchi-hahn/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Entertainment media offers a unique opportunity to convey cyber security knowledge to a wide audience in an engaging way. This study explores its impact on shaping cyber security beliefs through two rounds of interviews with 39 participants, using clips from the series Mr. Robot, known for its realistic depiction of cyber security. The clips addressed topics such as social engineering, password vulnerabilities, misconceptions about hackers targeting only high-value individuals, and the subtle nature of attacks. Participants who viewed cyber security-focused clips demonstrated increased awareness of social engineering and weak passwords. However, beliefs about hacker targets and attack detectability remained unchanged, likely due to participants’ pre-existing high awareness. Our findings highlight the value of positive role models in media, fostering empathy for victims and mitigating victim-blaming. By integrating accurate cyber security behaviors into entertainment, media can offer a compelling, informal channel for promoting secure practices and addressing widespread misconceptions.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Presentation at Mind Akademie 2026 in Mannheim</title><link>/post/2026-10-01-mind-akademie/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2026-10-01-mind-akademie/</guid><description>&lt;p>On October 1, Johanna Henrich gave a talk at the &lt;strong>MIND Akademie in Mannheim&lt;/strong> titled “Quantum Computers Threaten Our Encryption – Is Post-Quantum Cryptography the Solution?”.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Under this year&amp;rsquo;s theme, “Ende and Anfang,” the talk explored how quantum computers threaten today&amp;rsquo;s cryptography and how post-quantum cryptography can help secure our digital communication in the future.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Many thanks to the organizers for the invitation and the engaging discussions!&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-johanna-henrich">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="JOhanna Henrich presenting at Mind Akademie 2026" srcset="
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&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Image ©: Johanna Henrich
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Bachelor PSE - CyberSecurity Kids</title><link>/teaching/bpse-wise-26-27/</link><pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/teaching/bpse-wise-26-27/</guid><description>&lt;h3 id="inhalt-und-ablauf">Inhalt und Ablauf&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Im Rahmen dieses Projekts sollen didaktische Inhalte, Konzepte und technische Umsetzungen der IT-Sicherheit für Kinder und Jugendliche
entwickelt werden. Diese sollen dann im Frühjahr 2027 (Osterferien) im Rahmen eines Camps mit Kindern erprobt
und evaluiert werden (im Nachgang des PSE, nicht mehr Teil der Veranstaltung).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Diese Themen sollen bearbeitet werden&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Internet 101, Vertraulichkeit / E2E Sicherheit&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Digitale Identitäten / Accounts und Passwörter / Authentication Mechanism / 2FA / Passkeys&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Social Engineering / Phishing / Identitätsdiebstahl&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>Oversharing und Datenschutz / Fake news / KI&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h5 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h5>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Gute bis sehr gute Kenntnisse in IT-Sicherheit&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="literatur">Literatur&lt;/h3>
&lt;ol>
&lt;li>Bopp, Karen; Heinemann, Andreas; Renaud, Karen (2024): &amp;ldquo;Pass auf!&amp;rdquo; - Child-Oriented Cyber Safety &amp;amp; Security Educational Content. Mensch und Computer 2024 - Workshopband. DOI: 10.18420/muc2024-mci-ws17-163. Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.. MCI-WS17: Usable Security und Privacy Workshop. Karlsruhe. 1.-4. September 2024&lt;/li>
&lt;/ol>
&lt;p>Weitere Literatur wird zu Beginn bekannt gegeben.&lt;/p>
&lt;!-- 1. [Open Quantum Safe Project. Software for Prototyping Quantum-Resistant Cryptography.](https://openquantumsafe.org)
2. [Johanna Henrich (2024). Ways for confidential and authenticated hop-by-hop key establishment in QKDN. Sicherheit 2024, Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V..](https://doi.org/10.18420/sicherheit2024_024)
3. [Sonja Bruckner, Sebastian Ramacher, Christoph Striecks (2023). Muckle+: End-to-End Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchanges. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/653.](https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/653)
4. [Colin Boyd, Bor de Kock, Lise Millerjord (2023). Modular Design of KEM-Based Authenticated Key Exchange. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/167](https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/167)
5. [Julian Hohm, Andreas Heinemann, Alexander Wiesmaier (2023). Towards a maturity model for crypto-agility assessment. Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13877. Springer, Cham.](https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30122-3_7) -->
&lt;h3 id="dozenten">Dozenten&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="/author/andreas-heinemann/">Andreas Heinemann&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="formalia">Formalia&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Studierende, die die Veranstaltung belegen möchten, müssen am ersten Termin teilnehmen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Starttermin: 15.10.26, 10.15h, C23/02.02&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Weitere Formalia werden beim ersten Termin bekanntgegeben&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;!-- - Technische Projektwerkzeuge sind die GitLab Instanz des FBI und Elements (Chat) --></description></item><item><title>IT-Sicherheit</title><link>/teaching/it-sicherheit-wise-26-27/</link><pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/teaching/it-sicherheit-wise-26-27/</guid><description>&lt;h4 id="formalia">Formalia&lt;/h4>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Start: Di. 13.10.26, 08.30h, D14/01.04&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h4 id="links">Links&lt;/h4>
&lt;!-- - [Link zur Modulbeschreibung](https://obs.fbi.h-da.de/mhb/modul.php?nr=30.7126&amp;sem=20222) -->
&lt;!-- - [Moodle-Kursraum](https://lernen.h-da.de/course/view.php?id=18533) -->
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Moodle-Kursraum und Termine in my.h-da.de&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h4 id="dozent-der-vorlesung">Dozent der Vorlesung&lt;/h4>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="/author/andreas-heinemann/">Andreas Heinemann&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h4 id="betreuung-der-praktika">Betreuung der Praktika&lt;/h4>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich/">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>
&lt;br>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="/author/nicolai-schmitt/">Nicolai Schmitt&lt;/a>
&lt;br>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="/author/sven-wroblewski/">Sven Wroblewski&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>Four Contributions at SOUPS 2026</title><link>/post/2026-08-10-paper-and-poster-soups/</link><pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2026-08-10-paper-and-poster-soups/</guid><description>&lt;p>In the paper &lt;a href="https://nexusinstitut.de/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/SOUPS-2026-FrictionsWorkshop-Hahn-From-Why-to-How-CR.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;em>“From Why to How: Negotiating Inquiry and Design in Human-Centered Security,”&lt;/em>&lt;/a> Sara Hahn, research associate at UCS, discusses points of friction in interdisciplinary collaboration between psychology, computer science, and human-centered security. She argues for recognizing a fundamental understanding of human behavior and motivations as a valuable research contribution in its own right.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In &lt;a href="https://nexusinstitut.de/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/SOUPS-2026-FrictionsWorkshop-Heinemann-Gerber-One-Root-Frictions-CR.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;em>“One Root of the Frictions,”&lt;/em>&lt;/a> Prof. Dr. Andreas Heinemann and Nina Gerber describe the inherently interdisciplinary nature of Usable Privacy and Security research while pointing out that interdisciplinary elements have not yet been sufficiently incorporated into academic disciplines.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The two posters, &lt;a href="https://soups.page/2026/posters-files/soups2026posters-paper12-extended_abstract_paper.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;em>“The PIONEER Project: A PrIvacy companion for mOtivatioN and knowlEdge transfER”&lt;/em>&lt;/a> by Althaus et al. and &lt;a href="https://soups.page/2026/posters-files/soups2026posters-paper24-extended_abstract_paper.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;em>“Understanding the ‘Why’: Investigating the Design of Privacy Support Tools (PSTs) through the Lens of Psychological Needs”&lt;/em>&lt;/a> by Hahn et al., present work conducted within the &lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/project/pioneer/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;strong>PIONEER project&lt;/strong>&lt;/a>. They focus on the development of a privacy support tool aimed at increasing users’ privacy awareness and motivation, and on the question of how Privacy Support Tools should be designed.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://soups.page" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;strong>SOUPS&lt;/strong> (Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security)&lt;/a> is an international scientific conference focusing on usable IT security and privacy at the intersection of computer science, psychology, and HCI. It will take place this year from &lt;strong>August 23–26, 2026&lt;/strong>, in &lt;strong>Hannover, Germany&lt;/strong> and the two position papers will be presented as part of the workshop &lt;a href="https://nexusinstitut.de/workshop-at-symposium-on-usable-privacy-and-security/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;em>“Human-Centred Security Meets Social Sciences: Mapping the Frictions”&lt;/em>&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Performance Evaluation klassischer, PQC-basierter und hybrider Verfahren für die Etablierung symmetrischer Schlüssel in SSH unter variierenden Netzwerkbedingungen</title><link>/theses/2026-kurchanova/</link><pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/theses/2026-kurchanova/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Many of today’s widely used communication protocols rely heavily on classical public-key schemes, which a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break using Shor’s algorithm. However, encrypted communication is already at risk, since attackers can record and store it and, once such a computer exists, decrypt it. Quantum-resistant schemes have been developed to prevent this, and some of them are already standardized by NIST. They are now being integrated into existing protocols such as TLS and SSH. That mainly requires adapting the key exchange and the signature schemes. This thesis focuses on the key exchange. The cryptographic security of the new schemes has been well studied. In contrast, much less is known about their performance in SSH and their behavior under real-world network conditions. This highlights the need to test and compare classical, PQC and hybrid KEX algorithms in SSH under various network constraints.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As part of this thesis, a framework based on the OpenSSH fork from the OQS project was developed to record and analyze the SSH handshake under emulated network conditions, using two independent measurement methods. The conditions examined are latency, packet loss, bandwidth limitation, jitter and MTU. For all 61 SSH KEX algorithms, the framework determines the total KEX time and its distribution across the individual phases, the amount of data transmitted in bytes, the number of TCP packets and TCP retransmits, and the timeout rate.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In most of the network scenarios tested, KEX performance is governed not by the computation time of the individual KEX algorithm but by the amount of data transmitted. The clearest example is the Classic McEliece variant classic-mceliece-348864, which needs over 900 TCP packets at the smallest tested MTU of 576 B, whereas most of the other algorithms require only 25 to 35. Classic McEliece is thus impractical for real-world networks. Without network constraints, by contrast, most PQC algorithms are quite competitive with the classical ones, as the BIKE, ML-KEM and Kyber families as well as sntrup761 are up to around 5 ms faster than the classical curve25519-sha256, which is preferred by default in OpenSSH. The hybridization of PQC algorithms also has little impact on network behavior, since it adds at most 3.2% more bytes. KEX time increases by up to a fifth, but only because the implementation used performs classical and PQC key generation sequentially. This proportion could be reduced through parallel computation. Overall, the ML-KEM family and sntrup761 are recommended choices. Their hybrid variants are already available in OpenSSH.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Paper accepted at ICICS 2026</title><link>/post/2026-08-01-paper-accepted-icics/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 Aug 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2026-08-01-paper-accepted-icics/</guid><description>&lt;p>We are delighted to announce that the paper &lt;em>&amp;ldquo;Toward Secure Compilation: Leakage Detection for Masked Implementations in Jasmin&amp;rdquo;&lt;/em> has been accepted at ICICS 2026, the 28th International Conference on Information and Communications Security.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>What is it about? Cryptography quietly protects everyday things such as bank cards, car keys and instant messages. Surprisingly, attackers do not always need to break the mathematics behind it: while a chip encrypts, its power consumption fluctuates ever so slightly, and from these tiny fluctuations the secret key can sometimes be reconstructed, much like guessing what someone is typing just from the sound of the keystrokes. Programmers have techniques to guard against this, but the tools that translate a program into instructions for the chip can unintentionally weaken that protection. Our paper teaches one of these tools to detect such hidden weaknesses on its own and to point developers to their exact origin.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The paper was written by UCS researchers Nicolai Schmitt, Sven Wroblewski and Andreas Heinemann together with Fabio Campos (Hochschule Darmstadt).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Masking is a well-established software countermeasure against side-channel attacks. In practice, however, even an algorithmically correct masked implementation can still leak on real hardware, because the compiler and the microarchitecture of the target device may recombine values that the masking scheme was designed to keep separate. Established tools address this either through leakage simulation, which depends on a specific power model and is computationally expensive, or through formal verification of the source program, which does not cover the effects introduced by the later compilation stages.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The publication approaches this gap from within the compiler itself and presents a leakage detection pass for the Jasmin language, integrated into its formally verified compilation pipeline. Instead of simulating power traces, the analysis makes the causes of the detected leakage explicit, which allows developers to trace a finding back to its origin in the source program. The authors validate the approach on a structured set of test cases and intend it as the foundation for a subsequent compiler stage that removes the detected leakage automatically, thus constituting a first step toward secure compilation.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The paper will be presented at ICICS 2026 in Fukui, Japan, from 27 to 30 October 2026, and will appear in the conference proceedings published by Springer in the LNCS series. The acceptance highlights the ongoing research activities of the UCS group in the fields of secure compilation, side-channel analysis and the secure implementation of cryptographic primitives.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Preprint:&lt;/strong> &lt;a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1696" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2026/1696&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>The Best of Both Worlds: Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange for QKD(N) Without Signatures</title><link>/publication/2026-qkdn-hake-johanna/</link><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2026-qkdn-hake-johanna/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) are both contenders for securing communication against quantum adversaries, but are at different stages of maturity. For hedging security risks, hybridization is the default approach. Unlike previous research on classical–post-quantum hybrids, we propose a QKD-PQC hybrid for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE).To minimize the attack surface, we completely remove the requirement for digital signature schemes and propose a Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange (HAKE) that combines Post-Quantum (PQ) AKE and QKD key agreement, leveraging Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) for both key exchange and authentication. Our fully modular security analysis, based on the recent multi-input Key Derivation Function (KDF) framework by Backendal et al. (Eurocrypt 2025), establishes AKE security in the CK01 model and yields a conditional information-theoretic security guarantee when the QKD component is uncompromised; a property not achieved by prior hybrid protocols. We demonstrate the protocol’s practical feasibility with benchmarks using ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, and Classic McEliece.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Co-Creation of Privacy Support Tool Features</title><link>/offerings/2026-06-thesis-co-creation/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2026-06-thesis-co-creation/</guid><description>&lt;hr>
&lt;h3 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Privacy Support Tools sollen Nutzenden helfen, ihre Privatsphäre selbstbestimmt zu verwalten. Obwohl es von technischer Seite bereits einige Lösungen dafür gibt, werden diese nicht flächendeckend von Nutzenden angenommen. Das ist unter anderem darauf zurückzuführen, dass bei der Entwicklung der Fokus auf der technischen Seite liegt. Daher sind Studien mit Nutzenden erforderlich, um evidenzbasiert und nutzendenzentriert Privacy Support Tools zu gestalten.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die nutzendenzentrierte Analyse von Anforderungen und Features für Privacy Support Tools.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Literaturrecherche unter anderem zu Co-Creation, psychologischen Bedürfnissen, Privacy Support Tools sowie Human-Centered Design&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Konzeption, Durchführung und Auswertung von etwa drei Co-Creation Workshops&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Einordnung und Diskussion der Ergebnisse in Bezug zu Literatur und Praxis&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Ableitung und Erstellung eines Mock-Ups mit literatur- und evidenzbasierten Features&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Du bist Masterstudent*in an der h_da&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du besitzt Grundkenntnisse in Usable Security und sicherer Software-Entwicklung&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du bist an Interdisziplinarität interessiert und bereit, dich in psychologische Theorien einzuarbeiten&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du kannst eigenständig arbeiten&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="literatur">Literatur&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Co-create consortium. (n. d.). The co-create handboook: For creative professionals. &lt;a href="https://www.cocreate.training/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/co-design_handbook_FINAL.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://www.cocreate.training/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/co-design_handbook_FINAL.pdf&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kraus, L., Wechsung, I., &amp;amp; Möller, S. (2017). Psychological needs as motivators for security and privacy actions on smartphones. Journal of Information Security and Applications, 34, 34–45. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2016.10.002" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2016.10.002&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Story, P., Smullen, D., Yao, Y., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., Sadeh, N., &amp;amp; Schaub, F. (2021). Awareness, adoption, and misconceptions of web privacy tools. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2021(3), 308–333. &lt;a href="https://petsymposium.org/popets/2021/popets-2021-0049.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://petsymposium.org/popets/2021/popets-2021-0049.pdf&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Stöver, A., Hahn, S., Kretschmer, F., &amp;amp; Gerber, N. (2023). Investigating how Users Imagine their Personal Privacy Assistant. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2023(2), 384–402. &lt;a href="https://petsymposium.org/popets/2023/popets-2023-0059.php" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://petsymposium.org/popets/2023/popets-2023-0059.php&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="start">Start&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>ab WiSe26/27&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Weitere Informationen und Kontakt&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="/author/sara-hahn/">Sara Hahn&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Experience Sampling for Privacy Decisions</title><link>/offerings/2026-06-thesis-experience-sampling/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2026-06-thesis-experience-sampling/</guid><description>&lt;hr>
&lt;h3 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Privacy Support Tools sollen Nutzenden helfen, ihre Privatsphäre selbstbestimmt zu verwalten. Jedoch werden diese aktuell nicht flächendeckend von Nutzenden angenommen. Um die Ursachen besser untersuchen zu können, benötigen wir neben selbst berichteten Daten auch Daten, die das Verhalten der Personen erfassen. Bisher gibt es noch keine Lösung für das PIONEER Framework, welches das Experience Sampling mit dem Erfassen von Verhalten verknüpft.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Erarbeitung, Programmierung und Evaluierung eines Konzeptes für Experience Sampling für die nutzendenzentrierte Untersuchung von Privacy Support Tools.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Literaturrecherche unter anderem zu Experience Sampling, psychologischen Bedürfnissen und Privacy Support Tools sowie Human-Centered Design&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Ableitung und Programmierung eines Konzeptes für Experience Sampling innerhalb von Privacy Support Tools&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Konzeption, Durchführung und Auswertung von einer Evaluationsstudie zu Usability und Akzeptanz&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Du bist Masterstudent*in an der h_da&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du besitzt Grundkenntnisse in Usable Security und sicherer Software-Entwicklung&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du bist an Interdisziplinarität interessiert und bereit, dich in psychologische Theorien einzuarbeiten&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du kannst eigenständig arbeiten und hast Spaß am Programmieren&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="literatur">Literatur&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Gross, T., &amp;amp; Malzhacker, T. (2023). The experience sampling method and its tools: A review for developers, study administrators, and participants. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 7(EICS), Article 182. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3593234" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1145/3593234&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kraus, L., Wechsung, I., &amp;amp; Möller, S. (2017). Psychological needs as motivators for security and privacy actions on smartphones. Journal of Information Security and Applications, 34, 34–45. &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2016.10.002" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2016.10.002&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Story, P., Smullen, D., Yao, Y., Acquisti, A., Cranor, L. F., Sadeh, N., &amp;amp; Schaub, F. (2021). Awareness, adoption, and misconceptions of web privacy tools. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2021(3), 308–333. &lt;a href="https://petsymposium.org/popets/2021/popets-2021-0049.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://petsymposium.org/popets/2021/popets-2021-0049.pdf&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Stöver, A., Hahn, S., Kretschmer, F., &amp;amp; Gerber, N. (2023). Investigating how Users Imagine their Personal Privacy Assistant. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2023(2), 384–402. &lt;a href="https://petsymposium.org/popets/2023/popets-2023-0059.php" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://petsymposium.org/popets/2023/popets-2023-0059.php&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="start">Start&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>ab WiSe26/27&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Weitere Informationen und Kontakt&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="/author/sara-hahn/">Sara Hahn&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Paper accepted at AfricaCrypt 2026</title><link>/post/2026-05-08-paper-accepted-africacrypt/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2026-05-08-paper-accepted-africacrypt/</guid><description>&lt;p>The paper &lt;em>&amp;ldquo;The Best of Both Worlds: Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchange for QKD(N) without Signatures&amp;rdquo;&lt;/em> was authored by Sebastian Clermont (TU Darmstadt) and UCS researcher Johanna Henrich.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The publication proposes a hybrid authenticated key exchange that completely removes the need for digital signature schemes in order to reduce the cryptographic attack surface and improve crypto-agility. Instead, the protocol combines Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and QKD-based key agreement while leveraging PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) for both authentication and key exchange.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In addition, the paper provides a fully modular security analysis and the practical feasibility is demonstrated through benchmark implementations using ML-KEM, FrodoKEM, and Classic McEliece.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The work was carried out in collaboration with TU Darmstadt as part of the ATHENE research project SATURN.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The acceptance at AfricaCrypt 2026 highlights the ongoing research activities of the UCS group in the fields of quantum-secure communication, applied Cryptography and crypto-agility.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>PQC Update 2026</title><link>/post/2026-05-04-pqc-update-2026/</link><pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2026-05-04-pqc-update-2026/</guid><description>&lt;p>Johanna Henrich participated in the &lt;a href="https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de/de/presse-und-veranstaltungen/pressemitteilungen/2026/pqc-update-2026.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;em>PQC Update 2026&lt;/em>&lt;/a> organized by Fraunhofer AISEC. The event brought together experts from academia, industry, and public institutions to discuss the current state of PQC, migration challenges, and practical deployment strategies.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The meeting covered recent developments in standardization activities, migration planning for cryptographic infrastructures, and experiences from ongoing PQC transition projects. In addition, the event provided valuable opportunities for networking and exchange with researchers and practitioners working on quantum-safe security technologies.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Participation in the event supports the ongoing activities within the SATURN project, particularly regarding secure communication infrastructures and the transition towards quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-pqc-update-2026httpswwwaisecfraunhoferdedepresse-und-veranstaltungenpressemitteilungen2026pqc-update-2026html">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="PQC Update" srcset="
/post/2026-05-04-pqc-update-2026/Fraunhofer-AISEC-Gruppenfoto-5-PQC-Update-2026-s_hu4165018082947335159.webp 400w,
/post/2026-05-04-pqc-update-2026/Fraunhofer-AISEC-Gruppenfoto-5-PQC-Update-2026-s_hu10346842081721056268.webp 760w,
/post/2026-05-04-pqc-update-2026/Fraunhofer-AISEC-Gruppenfoto-5-PQC-Update-2026-s_hu10828389719461160050.webp 1200w"
src="/post/2026-05-04-pqc-update-2026/Fraunhofer-AISEC-Gruppenfoto-5-PQC-Update-2026-s_hu4165018082947335159.webp"
width="760"
height="486"
loading="lazy" data-zoomable />&lt;/div>
&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Image ©: &lt;a href="https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de/de/presse-und-veranstaltungen/pressemitteilungen/2026/pqc-update-2026.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">PQC Update 2026&lt;/a>
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>EICC 2026 at Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences</title><link>/post/2026-04-22-eicc-20226/</link><pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2026-04-22-eicc-20226/</guid><description>&lt;p>From 17 to 18 June, we will be hosting EICC 2026 at Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences. The final program is now available. &lt;a href="https://www.fvv.um.si/eicc2026/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Details&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Prototype Development and Benchmarking for Secure Key Forwarding in QKDN</title><link>/offerings/2025-12-hiwi-qkdn-prototype/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 11:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2025-12-hiwi-qkdn-prototype/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Leistungsstarke Quantencomputer könnten aktuell verwendete asymmetrische Verfahren wie Diffie Hellman und RSA brechen. Daher wurde in den vergangenen Jahren intensiv bezüglich quantensicherer Verfahren geforscht. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) nutzt die Physik der Quanten, um einen informationstheoretisch sicheren Schlüsselaustausch zu gewährleisten. Die Reichweite des Verfahrens ist jedoch begrenzt und es sind nur einfache Punkt-zu-Punkt Verbindungen oder Sterntopologien möglich, weshalb QKD Netzwerke (QKDN) entwickelt wurden, welche den Schlüssel hop-by-hop weiterleiten. Um weiterhin die Sicherheit des Schlüssels zu garantieren, muss die Weiterleitung jedoch streng vertraulich und authentifiziert erfolgen.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English: Powerful quantum computers could break currently used asymmetric schemes such as Diffie Hellman and RSA. For this reason, quantum-secure methods have been intensively researched in recent years. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) uses the physics of quanta to ensure information theoretically secure key exchange. However, the distance covered by the scheme is limited, and only simple point-to-point connections or star topologies are possible. For this reason, QKD networks (QKDN) have been developed, which forward the key hop by hop. However, in order to maintain the security of the key, the forwarding must be very secure.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>In vergangenen Projekten wurde eine Benchmarking Anwendung entwickelt, welche in der Lage ist, ein QKDN mit verschiedenen Knoten zu emulieren und ein Benchmarking durchzuführen, um die Schlüsseletablierung in einem QKD unterschiedlichen Konfigurationen zu evaluieren. Diese ist auch als Webanwendung verfügbar. Nun soll die Anwendung um diverse Konfigurationsmöglichkeiten erweitert und ein Benchmarking durchgeführt werden.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English: In previous projects, a benchmarking application was developed that is capable of emulating a QKDN with different nodes and performing benchmarking to evaluate key establishment in a QKD in different configurations. The application is also available as a web application. Now, the application is to be expanded to include various configuration options and benchmarking is to be performed.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Vertrautmachen mit dem Forschungsfeld QKDN (&lt;em>Es geht um das grobe Verständnis. Du musst kein Experte auf dem Gebiet werden!&lt;/em> ;-))&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Vertrautmachen mit der bestehenden QKDN Emulationsanwendung&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Implementierung neuer Konfigurationsoptionen für das Key Forwarding innerhalb der QKDN Emulationsanwendung wie bspw.:
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Authentifizierungsmechanismus der Knoten&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Hybridisierungsvariante der Schlüssel&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Mehrwegerouting&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Benchmarking des Key Forwardings und Gegenüberstellung der Varianten&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Familiarize yourself with the QKDN research field (It&amp;rsquo;s about a rough understanding. You don&amp;rsquo;t have to become an expert in the field! ;-))&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Familiarize yourself with the existing QKDN emulation application&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Implementation of new configuration options for key forwarding within the QKDN emulation application, such as:&lt;/em>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Authentication mechanism of the nodes&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Hybridization variant of the keys&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Multi-path routing&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Benchmarking of key forwarding and comparison of the variants&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Du bist Masterstudent an der HDa&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du besitzt Grundkenntnisse in IT-Sicherheit sowie Computernetze &amp;amp; Protokolle&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du hast Erfahrung im Programmieren&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du kannst eigenständig arbeiten&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You are a Master&amp;rsquo;s student at the HDa&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You have basic knowledge of IT security and computer networks &amp;amp; protocols&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You have experience in programming&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You work independently&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="organisation-bei-hiwi-jobs">Organisation (bei HiWi Jobs)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Wahlweise 40 - 80 Std/Monat&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Flexible Arbeitszeiten und flexibler Arbeitsort&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Regelmäßige Treffen, um Ergebnisse und weiteres Vorgehen zu besprechen (2-3 Wochen Rhythmus)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Vertragsdauer flexibel&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Optional 40-80 hours/month&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Flexible work schedule and location&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Regular meetings to discuss results and next steps (every 2-3 weeks)&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Flexible contract length, beyond 2024 possible&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="referenzen-und-literatur-auswahl">Referenzen und Literatur (Auswahl)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.18420/sicherheit2024_024" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Henrich: Ways for confidential and authenticated hop-by-hop key establishment in QKDN&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_22" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bruckner, Ramacher, Striecks: Muckle+: End-to-End Hybrid Authenticated Key Exchanges&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://openquantumsafe.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Quantum Safe. Software for prototyping quantum-resistant cryptography&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/11/9/3767" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tsai, Yang, Lin, Chang, Chang: Quantum Key Distribution Networks: Challenges and Future Research Issues in Security&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&amp;amp;arnumber=7993926" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tanizawa, Takahashi, Sato, Dixon: An approach to integrate quantum key distribution technology into standard secure communication applications&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="beginn">Beginn&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Ab April 2026&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Bei Interesse melden Sie sich bitte bei &lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich/">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Systematization of Knowledge (SoK): Architecture and Communication Patterns in QKD Networks</title><link>/offerings/2025-12-hiwi-sok-qkdn/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 11:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2025-12-hiwi-sok-qkdn/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Damit ein Wissenschaftler gute Arbeit leistet, muss er sich gut in seinem Forschungsfeld auskennen und immer auf dem Laufenden bleiben. Da unser Forschungsfeld der quantensicheren Kommunikation und im speziellen &lt;em>Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN)&lt;/em> jedoch sehr interdisziplinär aufgestellt ist und die Weiterentwicklung sehr schnell voran schreitet, ist es nur schwer möglich, stets den Überblick zu behalten. Damit das besser gelingt, nutzen wir das Tool &lt;a href="https://www.zotero.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zotero&lt;/a> für die digitale Literaturverwaltung. Auch wenn das vieles erleichtert, müssen die Arbeiten strukturiert eingepflegt und thematisch geordnet werden, um sich im Literaturdschungel zurecht zu finden.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English: For a scientist to do good work, they need to be well-versed in their field of research and always stay up to date. However, since our research field of quantum secure communication and in particular Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN) combines many different specialist areas and advancements are taking place very quickly, it is difficult to keep up with everything all the time. To make this easier, we use the Zotero tool for digital literature management. Even though this makes many things easier, it&amp;rsquo;s important to enter the work in a structured manner and organize it thematically so you can find your way through the literature jungle.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Wir benötigen eine strukturierte, thematisch geordnete Auflistung der verfügbaren Literatur des Forschungsfeldes QKDN. Publikationen müssen entsprechend ihrem Inhalt in Ordnern geclustert und zusätzlich sinnvoll getaggt werden, um für spätere wissenschaftliche Arbeiten schnell auf eine Literturbasis zurückgreifen zu können.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English: We need a structured, thematically organized list of available literature in the field of QKDN research. Publications need to be grouped into folders according to their content and tagged in a meaningful way in order to be able to quickly access a literature base for later scientific work.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Vertraut machen mit dem Forschungsfeld QKDN (&lt;em>Es geht um das grobe Verständnis. Du musst kein Experte auf dem Gebiet werden!&lt;/em> ;-))&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Einarbeiten in Zotero und unsere bestehende Literatursammlung&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Neue Ordnerstruktur anlegen und die in Zotero gesammelten Arbeiten zuordnen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Noch nicht in Zotero eingepflegte Arbeiten einpflegen und ebenfalls zurordnen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kontinuierliche Literaturrecherche, damit unsere Sammlung auf dem neuesten Stand bleibt&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Optional&lt;/em>: Konzept für eine sinnvolle Verwendung von Tags in Zotero&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Familiarize yourself with the QKDN research field (It&amp;rsquo;s about a rough understanding. You don&amp;rsquo;t have to become an expert in the field! ;-))&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Become familiar with Zotero and our existing literature collection&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Create a new folder structure and assign works collected in Zotero&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Enter and assign works not yet entered in Zotero&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Perform ongoing literature research to keep our collection up-to-date&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Optional: Conceptualize a meaningful use of tags in Zotero&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Du bist Bachelor- oder Masterstudent an der HDa&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du besitzt Grundkenntnisse in IT-Sicherheit sowie Computernetze &amp;amp; Protokolle&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du bist gut im Strukturieren und Sortieren&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du hast Spaß an Literaturrecherche und konzeptioneller Arbeit&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du kannst eigenständig arbeiten&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You are a bachelor or master student at the HDa&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You have basic knowledge of IT security and computer networks &amp;amp; protocols&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You are good at structuring and organizing&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You enjoy literature research and conceptual work&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You work independently&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="organisation">Organisation&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Wahlweise 40 - 80 Std/Monat&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Flexible Arbeitszeiten und flexibler Arbeitsort&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Regelmäßige Treffen, um Ergebnisse und weiteres Vorgehen zu besprechen (2-3 Wochen Rhythmus)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Vertragsdauer flexibel&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Optional 40-80 hours/month&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Flexible work schedule and location&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Regular meetings to discuss results and next steps (every 2-3 weeks)&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Flexible contract length&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="referenzen-und-literatur-auswahl">Referenzen und Literatur (Auswahl)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00031206" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Kurzanleitung für Zotero (Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg)&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/doc/1316333/1316333.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Lemke, Böhner: Softwarevergleich Literaturverwaltung&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.18420/sicherheit2024_024" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Henrich: Ways for confidential and authenticated hop-by-hop key establishment in QKDN&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/11/9/3767" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tsai, Yang, Lin, Chang, Chang: Quantum Key Distribution Networks: Challenges and Future Research Issues in Security&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&amp;amp;arnumber=7993926" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tanizawa, Takahashi, Sato, Dixon: An approach to integrate quantum key distribution technology into standard secure communication applications&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="beginn">Beginn&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Ab April 2026&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Bei Interesse melden Sie sich bitte bei &lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich/">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Systematization of Knowledge (SoK): Secure Key Forwarding in QKDN</title><link>/offerings/2025-12-thesis-sok-qkdn-forwarding/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 11:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2025-12-thesis-sok-qkdn-forwarding/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Leistungsstarke Quantencomputer könnten aktuell verwendete asymmetrische Verfahren wie Diffie Hellman und RSA brechen. Daher wurde in den vergangenen Jahren intensiv bezüglich quantensicherer Verfahren geforscht. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) nutzt die Physik der Quanten, um einen informationstheoretisch sicheren Schlüsselaustausch zu gewährleisten. Die Reichweite des Verfahrens ist jedoch begrenzt und es sind nur einfache Punkt-zu-Punkt Verbindungen oder Sterntopologien möglich, weshalb QKD Netzwerke (QKDN) entwickelt wurden, welche den Schlüssel hop-by-hop weiterleiten. Um weiterhin die Sicherheit des Schlüssels zu garantieren, muss die Weiterleitung jedoch streng vertraulich und authentifiziert erfolgen.
In den vergangenen Jahren wurden bereits unterschiedliche wissenschaftliche Arbeiten zur sicheren Weiterleitung eines Schlüssels im QKDN veröffentlicht, aber ein Gesamtüberblick und eine Evaluierung der unterschiedlichen Ansätze steht aus.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English: Powerful quantum computers could break currently used asymmetric schemes such as Diffie Hellman and RSA. For this reason, quantum-secure methods have been intensively researched in recent years. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) uses the physics of quanta to ensure information theoretically secure key exchange. However, the distance covered by the scheme is limited, and only simple point-to-point connections or star topologies are possible. For this reason, QKD networks (QKDN) have been developed, which forward the key hop by hop. However, in order to maintain the security of the key, the forwarding must be very secure.&lt;/em>
&lt;em>In recent years, various scientific papers on the secure transmission of keys in QKDN have been published, but a comprehensive overview and evaluation of the different approaches is still pending.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>In der Arbeit soll eine Übersicht dazu liefern, welche unterschiedlichen Ansätze zum Key Forwarding in QKDN in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur beschrieben werden und wie diese einzuordnen sind.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English: This paper aims to provide an overview of the different approaches to key forwarding in QKDN described in the scientific literature and how these can be classified.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Vertrautmachen mit dem Forschungsfeld QKDN (&lt;em>Es geht um das grobe Verständnis. Du musst kein Experte auf dem Gebiet werden!&lt;/em> ;-))&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Literaturrecherche zu QKDN Key Forwarding&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Systematisierte Einordnung/Klassifizierung der gefundenen Literatur&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Familiarize yourself with the QKDN research field (It&amp;rsquo;s about a rough understanding. You don&amp;rsquo;t have to become an expert in the field! ;-))&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Literature research on QKDN key forwarding&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Systematic classification of the literature found&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Du bist Masterstudent an der HDa&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du besitzt Grundkenntnisse in IT-Sicherheit sowie Computernetze &amp;amp; Protokolle&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du hast Erfahrung im Programmieren&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Du kannst eigenständig arbeiten&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You are a Master&amp;rsquo;s student at the HDa&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You have basic knowledge of IT security and computer networks &amp;amp; protocols&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You have experience in programming&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>You work independently&lt;/em>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="referenzen-und-literatur-auswahl">Referenzen und Literatur (Auswahl)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.18420/sicherheit2024_024" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Henrich: Ways for confidential and authenticated hop-by-hop key establishment in QKDN&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/11/9/3767" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tsai, Yang, Lin, Chang, Chang: Quantum Key Distribution Networks: Challenges and Future Research Issues in Security&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&amp;amp;arnumber=7993926" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tanizawa, Takahashi, Sato, Dixon: An approach to integrate quantum key distribution technology into standard secure communication applications&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="beginn">Beginn&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Ab April 2026&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Bei Interesse melden Sie sich bitte bei &lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich/">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Integration von PQC in bewährte Netzwerkkommunikationsprotokolle</title><link>/offerings/2025-12-thesis-pqc-network-protocol-integration/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2025-12-thesis-pqc-network-protocol-integration/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Sobald ein leistungsstarker Quantencomputer verfügbar ist, können aktuell verwendete asymmetrische Verfahren wie Diffie Hellman und RSA gebrochen werden. Der Mathematiker Peter Shor entwickelte bereits 1994 einen entsprechenden Algorithmus. Asymmetrische Kryptografie wird in unzähligen digitalen Systemen für einen vertraulichen Schlüsselaustausch und eine Authentifizierung genutzt. Daher wurde in den vergangenen Jahren intensiv bezüglich quantensicherer Verfahren geforscht. Alternative Verfahren der Post-Quanten-Kryptographie (PQC) weisen jedoch sehr individuelle Charakteristiken auf, sodass in der Regel kein Eins-zu-Eins-Austausch möglich ist.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Ziel der Arbeit ist die Ausarbeitung von Möglichkeiten zur Integration von PQC Algorithmen in ein oder mehrere Kommunikationsprotokolle, welche aktuell auf klassische kryptographische Primitive zurückgreifen. Denkbar wären Protokolle wie IPSec und IKEv2 oder DTLS. Sofern bereits mehrere Implementierungen und Evaluationen dieser beschrieben wurden, sollten diese aufgeführt und verglichen werden. Es können auch Änderungen an in der Literatur beschriebenen Konzepten vorgeschlagen oder gänzich neue Versionen designt werden. Verfügbare Implementierungen sollen abschließend mit Hilfe des von UCS entwickelten Frameworks evaluiert werden.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Literaturrecherche zu Optionen bezüglich Integration in bekannte Protokolle wie IPSec und IKEv2 oder DTLS&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Einschätzung zur Anwendbarkeit der Optionen und Ausarbeitung signifikanter Unterschiede zwischen Implementierungen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Vorschläge zur Optimierung der Optionen oder Ausarbeitung von Alternativen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Integration von Implementierungen in das Framework aus der Masterarbeit von Henrich zur Evalueirung der neuen Protkollversionen&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse in IT-Sicherheit, insbesondere asymmetrische Kryptographie&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse in Computernetze &amp;amp; Protokolle&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Grundkenntnisse in Linux&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Spaß an Literaturrecherche und konzeptioneller Arbeit&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="referenzen-und-literatur-auswahl">Referenzen und Literatur (Auswahl)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2303.15148" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Johanna Henrich: Performanz Evaluation von PQC in TLS 1.3 unter variierenden Netzwerkcharakteristiken. Abschlussarbeit M.Sc.. Februar 2022&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1447.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Paquin, Stebila, Tamvada: Benchmarking post-quantum cryptography in TLS. PQCrypto 2020&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://openquantumsafe.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Quantum Safe. Software for prototyping quantum-resistant cryptography&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3386367.3431305" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Assessing the overhead of post-quantum cryptography in TLS 1.3 and SSH&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348958250_Zur_Integration_von_Post-Quantum_Verfahren_in_bestehende_Softwareprodukte/fulltext/6018c719299bf1b33e405bef/Zur-Integration-von-Post-Quantum-Verfahren-in-bestehende-Softwareprodukte.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zur Integration von Post-Quantum Verfahren in bestehende Softwareprodukte&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Multiple Key Exchanges in IKEv2 (IETF Internetdraft)&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="beginn">Beginn&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Ab April 2026&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Bei Interesse melden Sie sich bitte bei &lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich/">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Integration von QKD in TLS</title><link>/offerings/2025-12-thesis-qkd-in-tls/</link><pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2025-12-thesis-qkd-in-tls/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Sobald ein leistungsstarker Quantencomputer verfügbar ist, können aktuell verwendete asymmetrische Verfahren wie Diffie Hellman und RSA gebrochen werden. Der Mathematiker Peter Shor entwickelte bereits 1994 einen entsprechenden Algorithmus. Asymmetrische Kryptografie wird in unzähligen digitalen Systemen für einen vertraulichen Schlüsselaustausch und eine Authentifizierung genutzt. Daher wurde in den vergangenen Jahren intensiv bezüglich quantensicherer Verfahren geforscht. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) nutzt die Physik der Quanten, um einen informationstheoretisch sicheren Schlüsselaustausch zu gewährleisten. Zukünftig sollen Endnutzer über eine einfache HTTP-basierte Schnittstelle an ein QKD-Netzwerk (QKDN) angebunden werden, welches symmetrische Schlüssel für entfernte Kommunikationspartner bereitstellt. Die Schlüssel werden über eine einfache ID eindeutig zugeordnet.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Ziel der Arbeit ist die Ausarbeitung von Möglichkeiten zur Integration von QKD in das vielfach verwendete Protokoll TLS 1.3. Dafür muss die Anwendungsschnittstelle eines QKDNs analysiert und mit den unterschiedlichen Erweiterungsmöglichkeiten von TLS abgeglichen werden. Die erarbeiteten Optionen sollen beschrieben und gegenübergestellt werden. Bereits verfügbare Prototypen könnten zudem getestet oder Konzepte selbst prototypisch implementiert werden. Auch eine anschließende Performanz Evaluation wäre denkbar.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Literatur- und Internetrecherche zu Optionen bezüglich der Integration von QKD in TLS&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Ausarbeitung von Integrationsmöglichkeiten für QKD in TLS - sowohl aus der Literatur als auch eigene Ideen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Einschätzung zur Anwendbarkeit der Optionen und Ausarbeitung signifikanter Unterschiede zwischen diesen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Optional&lt;/em>: Vorschläge zur Optimierung der Optionen oder Ausarbeitung einer alternativen Vorgehensweise&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Optional&lt;/em>: Inbetriebnahme verfügbarer Prototypen oder Implementierung eines eigenen Prototypen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;em>Optional&lt;/em>: Integration von Implementierungen in das Framework aus der Masterarbeit von Henrich und Evaluierung der Performanz&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse in IT-Sicherheit&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse in Computernetze &amp;amp; Protokolle, insbesondere TLS&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Grundkenntnisse in Linux&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Grundkenntnisse und Interesse im Bereich Quantenphysik oder Elektrotechnik wünschenswert, aber nicht zwingend erforderlich&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Spaß an Literaturrecherche und konzeptioneller Arbeit&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="referenzen-und-literatur-auswahl">Referenzen und Literatur (Auswahl)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2303.15148" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Johanna Henrich: Performanz Evaluation von PQC in TLS 1.3 unter variierenden Netzwerkcharakteristiken. Abschlussarbeit M.Sc.. Februar 2022&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1447.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Paquin, Stebila, Tamvada: Benchmarking post-quantum cryptography in TLS. PQCrypto 2020&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://openquantumsafe.org" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Quantum Safe. Software for prototyping quantum-resistant cryptography&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/11/9/3767" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tsai, Yang, Lin, Chang, Chang: Quantum Key Distribution Networks: Challenges and Future Research Issues in Security&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&amp;amp;arnumber=7993926" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Tanizawa, Takahashi, Sato, Dixon: An approach to integrate quantum key distribution technology into standard secure communication applications&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="beginn">Beginn&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Ab April 2026&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Bei Interesse melden Sie sich bitte bei &lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich/">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>ATHENE Usable Security and Privacy Lab</title><link>/post/2025-09-26-usp-lab-launch/</link><pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2025-09-26-usp-lab-launch/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="participation-welcome-launch-of-the-athene-usable-security-and-privacy-lab-at-h_da">Participation welcome: Launch of the ‘ATHENE Usable Security and Privacy Lab’ at h_da&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>At the beginning of October, the ‘ATHENE Usable Security and Privacy Lab’ (USP Lab) began its work at h_da. The lab is run by the User-Centered Security working group and supported by the National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity ATHENE. Researchers and students at h_da can use the lab for projects and studies on the usability of security and privacy related technologies. The focus lies on questions of how security and privacy technologies can be designed to support users in making informed decisions and effectively protect their personal data. This includes, for example, the comprehensible presentation of privacy policies or transparent cookie banners that openly explain which data are processed and in what form when using an application. Research into user behaviour is also of great interest, for example regarding trust in AI tools and the information users may reveal.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The USP Lab has comprehensive technical resources and offers methodological support to investigate such issues, for example through usability tests on PCs or mobile devices, user interviews, surveys, eye tracking and more. The laboratory is located in building D19, room 02.12, and can also be used for teaching purposes. Researchers who are not members of ATHENE can request to use the USP Lab at any time. The laboratory website also provides detailed explanations and instructions. If required, the team will be happy to assist you with individual methodological consultation. In addition, the website provides all the necessary information on booking the laboratory and the available equipment. If you have any questions, please contact us (&lt;a href="mailto:usp-lab@h-da.de">usp-lab@h-da.de&lt;/a>).&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>A Lot of Data and Added Complexity. How Does PQC Affect the Performance of My TLS Connection?</title><link>/publication/2025-isc-henrich/</link><pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2025-isc-henrich/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>In a previous study, Henrich et al. (ISC &amp;lsquo;23) demonstrate how TLS handshake performance is affected not only by different Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Key Encapsulation Mechanisms KEMs and security levels, but also by varying physical network conditions. In particular, they show that prior to selecting a PQC scheme replacement for TLS, it is important to conduct an analysis of the anticipated network conditions for applications that require a high level of responsiveness. In this paper, we build upon the afore mentioned work and complement the previous experiments to include digital signature PQC schemes and hybrid variants, as well as various compositions of certificate chains. Moreover, an analysis is conducted on the effects of deploying real physical servers and varying the underlying network stack configuration. Our results show that incorporating PQC signature schemes does not negatively impact the overall transmission time as substantially as poor network conditions. However, operating at high security levels frequently results in delays using PQC schemes. These findings are consistent across hybrid schemes as well. We conclude that migrating TLS to PQ-only or hybrid usage can generally be undertaken with a high degree of confidence. However, considering suboptimal network conditions or the use of higher security levels, a cautious transition is recommended. In such cases, the configuration of certificate chains or increasing the TCP Congestion Window might prove beneficial.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Simulation-based Software Leakage Evaluation for the RISC-V Platform</title><link>/publication/2025-isc-nicolai/</link><pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2025-isc-nicolai/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Side-channel attacks are critical as they, despite the mathematical security of the algorithm, break the security assumption that private data stays hidden from the adversary. Developing secure hardware can be expensive, as multiple iterations of prototyping may be required to achieve a satisfactory level of security against side-channel attacks. Currently, the fairly new and open-source CPU-platform RISC-V is gaining traction by entering the IoT- and consumer market and also gains interest in security oriented projects such as OpenTitan. In case of security-critical applications, especially when the hardware is exposed to third party, the implementations of cryptographic algorithms must be secure against side-channel attacks. For the RISC-V platform currently only a small number of tools exist to assess the probing security. Further, we could identify a lack of simulation-based tooling to do so, with the ability to analyze larger implementations as e.g., full ciphers. To address this demand, we use PROLEAD_SW as a starting point and extend it to support the RISC-V platform. By analyzing micro-architectural leakage effects on the RISC-V platform we show that the CPU-independent leakage model used by PROLEAD_SW for the ARM architecture is suitable for the RISC-V platform. To verify the correctness of the new tooling, test-vectors are executed with the new tooling. In a final step, the performance of the new tooling is compared to the performance of the original version of PROLEAD_SW by analyzing two masked AES C implementations with both tools.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Contact</title><link>/contact/</link><pubDate>Sat, 06 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/contact/</guid><description/></item><item><title>People</title><link>/team/</link><pubDate>Sat, 06 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/team/</guid><description/></item><item><title>Two papers accepted at ISC 2025</title><link>/post/2025-09-09-paper-isc/</link><pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2025-09-09-paper-isc/</guid><description>&lt;p>Two papers from our working group have been accepted at &lt;a href="https://isc25.skku.edu/accepted-papers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ISC 2025&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Our first paper &amp;ldquo;Simulation-based Software Leakage Evaluation for the RISC-V Platform&amp;rdquo; by Nicolai Schmitt, Jannik Zeitschner (Ruhr Universität Bochum) and Andreas Heinemann extends a tool (PROLEAD_SW) for the RISC-V platform in order to detect leakage.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Our second paper &amp;ldquo;A Lot of Data and Added Complexity. How Does PQC Affect the Performance of My TLS Connection?&amp;rdquo; by Johanna Henrich, Nicolai Schmitt, Nouri Alnahawi and Andreas Heinemann investigates the TLS handshake performance when using PQC schemes.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>PIONEER project presents current investigations and publications</title><link>/post/2025-08-07-iv2025-poster/</link><pubDate>Mon, 25 Aug 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2025-08-07-iv2025-poster/</guid><description>&lt;p>The ATHENE research project PIONEER was featured at the 29th International Conference Information Visualisation held on August 07, 2025 in Darmstadt.
The conference brought together leading experts from academia and research institutions to discuss the latest developments in information visualisation, machine learning, and data science.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>During the event, Sara Hahn presented the latest research investigations and publications on PIONEER’s innovative Digital Privacy Companion.
In her talk, Sara Hahn provided a comprehensive overview of the project’s theoretical foundations and research methodology, while also showcasing current investigations, findings, and recent publications.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The PIONEER project is part of ATHENE’s mission to advance cybersecurity and privacy research with practical solutions that can be transferred into real-world applications. &lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-sara-hahn-presenting-the-poster-on-day-2-of-the-iv2025-conference-image-169-iv2025">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Impressions 1" srcset="
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&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Sara Hahn presenting the poster on Day 2 of the IV2025 Conference. Image © IV2025
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>DemoQuanDT: a carrier-grade QKD network</title><link>/publication/2025-jocn-henrich/</link><pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2025 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2025-jocn-henrich/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Quantum key distribution networks (QKDNs) enable secure communication even in the age of powerful quantum computers. In the hands of a network operator, which can offer its service to many users, the economic viability of a QKDN increases significantly. The highly challenging operator–user relationship in a large-scale network setting demands additional requirements to ensure carrier-grade operation. Addressing this challenge, this work presents a carrier-grade QKDN architecture, which combines the functional QKDN architecture with the operational perspective of a network operator, ultimately enhancing the economic viability of QKDNs. The focus is on the network and key management aspects of a QKDN while assuming state-of-the-art commercial QKD modules. The presented architecture was rolled out within an in-field demonstrator, connecting the cities of Berlin and Bonn over a link distance of 923 km across Germany. We could show that the proposed network architecture is feasible, integrable, and scalable, making it suitable for deployment in real-world networks. Overall, the presented carrier-grade QKDN architecture promises to serve as a blueprint for network operators providing QKD-based services to their customers.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Studentische Hilfskraft (m/w/d) für wissenschaftliche Unterstützung gesucht</title><link>/offerings/2025-06-student-assist-leak/</link><pubDate>Sun, 22 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2025-06-student-assist-leak/</guid><description>&lt;h3 id="motivation-und-ziel">Motivation und Ziel&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Das ATHENE LEAK Projekt hat das Ziel der Entwicklung neuartiger, hardwarenaher und ressourcen-freundlicher Seitenkanal-Leakagemodelle für die RISC-V CPU-Plattform.
RISC-V ist eine verhältnismäßig neue CPU Plattform, welche zunehmend Verbeitung in IoT- und sicherheitsrelevanten Bereichen findet, wodurch der Bedarf an sicheren Implementierungen auf RISC-V-Basis steigt.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="deine-aufgaben">Deine Aufgaben&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Unterstützung bei der Literaturrecherche und -aufbereitung zu Leakage-Assessment-Tooling und Leakage-Gegenmaßnahmen.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Praktische Messung von Seitenkanälen an Hardware&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Entwicklung und Implementierung von Leakage-Modellen z.B. in Form von Leakage-Assessment Tooling.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Hardwarenahe Programmierung z.B. auf RISC-V Entwicklungsboards.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Eingeschriebene:r Student:in (Idealerweise Informatik oder Elektrotechnik)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Interesse an Seitenkanal-Analyse, Probing-Security und wissenschaflichem Arbeiten&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Strukturierte, zuverlässige und eigenständige Arbeitsweise&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="wir-bieten-dir">Wir bieten dir&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Einblicke in spannende und aktuelle Forschungsthemen im Bereich der Hardwaresicherheit und Seitenkanalanalyse&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Die Möglichkeit an aktuellen wissenschaftlichen Publikationen mit zu wirken&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Flexible Arbeitszeiten&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="organisation">Organisation&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Standort: Hochschule Darmstadt – Fachbereich Informatik – UCS Research Group&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Arbeitszeit: zwischen 8 und 20 Stunden pro Woche (flexibel einteilbar; Stundenanzahl anpassbar)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Start: zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Stundensatz: üblicher Stundensatz für SHKs&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Projekt: LEAK: Leakage Models for Masking: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice (&lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/project/leak/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://ucs.h-da.de/project/leak/&lt;/a>)&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="interesse">Interesse?&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Dann sende uns deine Bewerbung (Leistungsübersicht und Lebenslauf) an &lt;a href="mailto:nicolai.schmitt@h-da.de">nicolai.schmitt@h-da.de&lt;/a>. Wir freuen uns auf dich!&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Wir begrüßen Fabian im Team</title><link>/post/2025-04-1-new-member-fabian/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Apr 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2025-04-1-new-member-fabian/</guid><description>&lt;p>Wir freuen uns, dass Fabian Seidl zum 01.04. unsere Gruppe verstärkt. Fabian hat einen Master in
Computer Science und wird im Projekt SATURN gemeinsam mit Johanna Fragestellungen rund um PQC und QKDN untersuchen.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Willkommen, Fabian.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Portierung eines Software Probing-Security Analyse Tools auf GPU Plattformen</title><link>/offerings/2025-03-thesis-prolead-gpu-port/</link><pubDate>Thu, 20 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2025-03-thesis-prolead-gpu-port/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Seitenkanalangriffe gewinnen zunehmend an Bedeutung, wenn wie z.B. im Falle einer Smartcard, die Hardware in die Hände des Angreifers gelangen kann.
In so einen Fall muss die Hardware-Software Kombination gegen Angriffe auf die Implementierung geschützt sein.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Um die Sicherheit von Hardware-Software Kombinationen gegen Seitenkanalangriffe zu evaluieren, können heutzutage Software-Tools verwendet werden,
welche z.B. auf Basis eines Leakage-Modells sowie einer Ausführung der Software in einem Emulator arbeiten.
Ein Derartiges Tool wird von uns derzeit für die verhältnismäßig neue CPU-Architektur RISC-V entwickelt.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Ein Leakage Assessment der Hardware-Software-Kombination eines Sicherheitsproduktes noch vor dem ersten Prototyp verringert die Entwicklungskosten und die Zeit pis zum Rollout des Produktes.
Dennoch kann ein simulations-basiertes Leakage-Assessment im Sinne von Rechenzeit und Speicher ressourcen-aufwendig.
Da in der heutigen Zeit z.B. im Hinblick auf KI-Anwendungen oftmals in leistungsfähige GPU-Cluster investiert wird, wird eine Unterstützung von GPU-basierten Plattformen zunehmend wichtiger.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Ziel dieser Arbeit ist, unser in Entwicklung befindliches Leakage-Assessment Tool so zu erweitern oder zu portieren, dass es auf die Rechenleistung von GPU-Clustern zurückgreifen kann.
Eine Umsetzung könnte beipsielsweise mit Hilfe von OpenCL oder CUDA erfolgen.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die Entwicklung eines Konzeptes zur Trennung der Implementierung zwische GPU und Host-Seite,
so dass diese effizient arbeitet und mit der Anzahl der GPUs skaliert.
In einem weiteren Schritt soll das Konzept implementiert werden.
Des weiteren sollen Konzepte erarbeitet werden, wie sich die GPU- sowie die klassische Implementierung nebeneinander warten und weiterentwickeln lassen.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Gute C und C++ Kenntnisse&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Vorkenntnisse in CUDA, OpenCL&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Vorkenntnisse im Umgang mit Git, GNU-Make sowie Linux&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Spaß an Softwareentwicklung&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="referenzen-und-literatur-auswahl">Referenzen und Literatur (Auswahl)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/034.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zeitschner et al., (2023). PROLEAD_SW Probing-Based Software Leakage Detection for ARM Binaries&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_27" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ishai et al., (2003). Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7270" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Faust et al., (2018). Composable Masking Schemes in the Presence of Physical Defaults &amp;amp; the Robust Probing Model&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9294" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Marshall et al., (2021). MIRACLE: MIcRo-ArChitectural Leakage Evaluation: A study of micro-architectural power leakage across many devices&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Haben wir Ihr Interesse geweckt?
Kontakt: &lt;a href="/author/nicolai-schmitt/">Nicolai Schmitt&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Nationale Konferenz IT-Sicherheitsforschung 2025</title><link>/post/2025-03-17-bmbf-konf-berlin/</link><pubDate>Sun, 16 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2025-03-17-bmbf-konf-berlin/</guid><description>&lt;p>UCS will present the results of the DemoQuanDT research project in a poster session at the &lt;a href="https://www.forschung-it-sicherheit-kommunikationssysteme.de/service/termine/nationale-konferenz-it-sicherheitsforschung-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&amp;ldquo;National Conference IT Security Research 2025 - IT Security and Democracy&amp;rdquo;&lt;/a> in Berlin, which is being hosted by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The presentation will be based on a poster entitled &amp;ldquo;Confidential and authenticated key forwarding in QKD networks,&amp;rdquo; which has been accepted for the poster pitch on March 18, 2025. The central inquiry concerns the extent to which security and performance can be assured for key forwarding in extensive, interconnected QKD networks. The technology is poised to facilitate secure transmission of messages, that is, confidentiality and authentication. In contradistinction to the asymmetric cryptographic approaches currently employed, the security of the QKD system is expected to withstand the threat posed by quantum computers.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The poster was authored by Johanna Henrich. Her research focuses on key establishment in QKD networks and the potential for integrating QKD and PQC to ensure quantum-safe and high-performance communication. The research is conducted in close collaboration with the &lt;a href="https://danet.h-da.io/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">danet research group&lt;/a> led by Prof. Dr Martin Stiemerling.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-national-conference-it-security-research-2025httpswwwforschung-it-sicherheit-kommunikationssystemedeserviceterminenationale-konferenz-it-sicherheitsforschung-2025">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="National Conference IT Security Research 2025" srcset="
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&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Image ©: &lt;a href="https://www.forschung-it-sicherheit-kommunikationssysteme.de/service/termine/nationale-konferenz-it-sicherheitsforschung-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National Conference IT Security Research 2025&lt;/a>
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Benchmarking von PQC KEM Algorithmen in QUIC unter variierenden Netzwerkbedingungen</title><link>/theses/2025-mueller/</link><pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/theses/2025-mueller/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>The advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens the currently used classical asymmetric cryptography. Attackers can already record network traffic today, intending to decrypt it later using cryptographically relevant quantum computers. In order to continue to guarantee the security of asymmetric cryptography, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is being adopted. While the performance of these primitives in isolation is usually well understood, their performance within some protocols remains insufficiently investigated. QUIC is a new general-purpose transport protocol of the IETF but requires further study of PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) algorithms. Thorough investigation of PQC KEM algorithms in QUIC across varying network conditions is therefore highly important to accompany the migration to PQC.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this work, handshakes are repeatedly performed in QUIC and comparatively in TLS1.3/TCP in an emulated network and the Time to First Byte is measured. The network conditions, algorithms, and congestion control algorithms are varied across different network scenarios and security levels and then evaluated.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>While the obvious choice is always the algorithm with the shortest calculation time and transmission length, this is not the case in QUIC. Here, it is worth sending a moderate amount of packets in case of random packet loss so that not too many lost packets have to be retransmitted, but the communication is also not initially delayed by a second. ML-KEM is the best choice in every scenario except for high random packet loss. If ML-KEM is not available, the recommendation is not clear, as it varies depending on the scenario and security level between BIKE and HQC. HQC is the better choice if the network conditions are good or if there is a high-latency scenario due to the low calculation time of the KEM operations. BIKE, with its shorter transmission length, is the better choice at low transmission rates, high jitter and at security level 5 with high latency, as the initial packets of the server from HQC do not fit into the initial congestion control window. In case of random packet loss, both BIKE and HQC are good algorithms, HQC rather in lower security levels and at high packet loss, BIKE at lower packet loss and higher security level.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Future research should extend the investigation to PQC signature algorithms in QUIC, further supporting the migration to PQC.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Parametrisierung simulations-basierter Software Probing-Security Analyse für spezifische CPU-Implementierungen</title><link>/offerings/2025-01-thesis-parametrizable-leakage-modell/</link><pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2025-01-thesis-parametrizable-leakage-modell/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Seitenkanalangriffe gewinnen zunehmend an Bedeutung, wenn wie z.B. im Falle einer Smartcard, die Hardware in die Hände des Angreifers gelangen kann.
In so einen Fall muss die Hardware-Software Kombination gegen Angriffe auf die Implementierung geschützt sein.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Um die Sicherheit von Hardware-Software Kombinationen gegen Seitenkanalangriffe zu evaluieren, können heutzutage Software-Tools verwendet werden,
welche z.B. auf Basis eines Leakage-Modells sowie einer Ausführung der Software in einem Emulator arbeiten.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Da die verwendeten Leakagemodelle generisch arbeiten, treffen die Aussagen der Tools nicht zwangsläufig genau auf eine Hardware-Implementierung einer CPU zu, wodurch ggf. die falschen oder mehr Schutzmaßnahmen auf der Software-Seite ergriffen werden könnten als notwendig und somit die Performance der Implementierung beeinträchtigt werden könnte.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Ziel dieser Arbeit ist, anhand verschieder Implementierungen von RISC-V CPUs festzustellen, welche Unterschiede im Leakage-Verhalten zwischen verschiedenen Implementierungen von CPUs der RISC-V Plattform beobachtet bzw. gemessen werden können.
Auf Basis von PROLEAD_SW wird von uns ein Tool für die RISC-V Plattform entwickelt, mit dessen Hilfe die Probing-Security von Software, welche auf RISC-V CPUs ausgeführt wird, evaluiert werden kann.
Auf Basis dieser Datenlage soll identifiziert werden, wie weit das dem Tool zugrundeliegende Leakage-Modell verändert werden muss oder parametrisierbar gemacht werden muss, um genauere Aussagen für spezifische RISC-V implementierungen zu treffen.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Gegebenenfalls Entwicklung neuer Testcases in Assembler und C&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Gegebenenfalls Durchführen von Messungen an echter Hardware&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Auswerten von Messdaten&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Entwicklung eines Konzeptes für ein parametrisierbares Leakage-Modell&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Implementierung des parametrisierbaren Leakage-Modells&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Gute C, C++ und Assembler Kenntnisse&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Python Kenntnisse&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Vorkenntnisse im Umgang mit Git, GNU-Make sowie Linux&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Spaß an Softwareentwicklung&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="referenzen-und-literatur-auswahl">Referenzen und Literatur (Auswahl)&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/034.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zeitschner et al., (2023). PROLEAD_SW Probing-Based Software Leakage Detection for ARM Binaries&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_27" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ishai et al., (2003). Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/7270" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Faust et al., (2018). Composable Masking Schemes in the Presence of Physical Defaults &amp;amp; the Robust Probing Model&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9294" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Marshall et al., (2021). MIRACLE: MIcRo-ArChitectural Leakage Evaluation: A study of micro-architectural power leakage across many devices&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Haben wir Ihr Interesse geweckt?
Kontakt: &lt;a href="/author/nicolai-schmitt/">Nicolai Schmitt&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>SATURN</title><link>/project/saturn/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/project/saturn/</guid><description>&lt;p>The SATURN project addresses critical security challenges in Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN). With the development of quantum computers, the threat to classical cryptography is growing, making quantum-safe alternatives essential. Particularly critical are &amp;lsquo;harvest now, decrypt later&amp;rsquo; attacks, where encrypted data is stored today to be decrypted later by quantum computers. While QKD enables secure key exchange from an information-theoretic point of view, its practical implementation in networks poses major challenges. Current QKD modules over optical fibre are limited to distances of about 150 km. For longer distances, intermediate nodes must be used, which raises new security issues.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The SATURN project will develop secure and efficient protocols for key forwarding in QKDNs. A hybrid approach will be pursued, combining QKD with post-quantum cryptography (PQC). Existing protocols will be formally analysed, new security models will be developed, and practical implementation guidelines will be produced. The results should provide an informed decision-making framework for the use of QKDNs, taking into account both security and practical aspects such as performance, scalability and crypto-agility.&lt;/p>
&lt;h4 id="contact">Contact&lt;/h4>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>PIONEER project presents current results</title><link>/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/</link><pubDate>Thu, 21 Nov 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/</guid><description>&lt;p>UCS recently participated in the ATHENE-Conference on Cognitive Security, held on November 19, 2024, at the historic Jügelhaus in Frankfurt am Main. The event gathered experts from academia, media, and politics to address the pressing challenges posed by cognitive attacks in the digital age. In addition to interesting talks and an insightful panel discussion, several projects were presented in the demo sessions.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Sara Hahn had the opportunity to present the ATHENE project PIONEER’s mobile prototype during the demo sessions with her project colleagues from the TU Darmstadt. The conference guests could explore the prototype’s features, such as lessons and quizzes about privacy, or compare applications regarding their privacy friendliness.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Within our project PIONEER, we strive to empower users in their digital sovereignty by providing them with the necessary knowledge and motivating them to acquire and apply competencies in their everyday digital lives.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-the-pioneer-team-image-169-catharina-frank">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Impressions 1" srcset="
/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/ATHENE-Kognitive-Sicherheit-1_hu9239945898132149936.webp 400w,
/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/ATHENE-Kognitive-Sicherheit-1_hu14115008474100706310.webp 760w,
/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/ATHENE-Kognitive-Sicherheit-1_hu7028380283064851052.webp 1200w"
src="/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/ATHENE-Kognitive-Sicherheit-1_hu9239945898132149936.webp"
width="760"
height="507"
loading="lazy" data-zoomable />&lt;/div>
&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
The PIONEER Team. Image © Catharina Frank
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-conference-impressions-image-169-catharina-frank">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Impressions 2" srcset="
/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/ATHENE-Kognitive-Sicherheit-2_hu15294400833997026835.webp 400w,
/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/ATHENE-Kognitive-Sicherheit-2_hu6125913590890007238.webp 760w,
/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/ATHENE-Kognitive-Sicherheit-2_hu10417369759856008191.webp 1200w"
src="/post/2024-11-19-conference-ffm/ATHENE-Kognitive-Sicherheit-2_hu15294400833997026835.webp"
width="760"
height="507"
loading="lazy" data-zoomable />&lt;/div>
&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Conference Impressions. Image © Catharina Frank
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>IETF Meeting 121 in Dublin</title><link>/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/</link><pubDate>Thu, 24 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/</guid><description>&lt;p>UCS took part in the &lt;a href="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/121/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">121st meeting of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in Dublin&lt;/a> from 2.-8. November 2024. The IETF develops standards and best practices for the Internet and thus has a significant influence on its design.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Among other things, Johanna Henrich led a project group together with the &lt;a href="https://danet.h-da.io/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&lt;em>danet&lt;/em>&lt;/a> research group of Prof. Dr. Martin Stiemerling. The project was part of the &lt;a href="https://www.ietf.org/meeting/hackathons/121-hackathon/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Hackathon&lt;/a>, which took place from 2.-3. November. The aim was to find out how the interfaces in Quantum Key Distribution Networks (QKDN) can be designed and how quantum-resistant protection of their communication can be achieved. Read more in our &lt;a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/121/materials/slides-121-hackathon-sessd-protocols-for-quantum-key-distribution-networks-qkdn-00" target="_blank" rel="noopener">final presentation&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In addition, Johanna Henrich participated in various IETF and IRTF working group sessions throughout the week to answer questions such as how post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and QKD, individually and in hybrid form, can be integrated into the existing Internet infrastructure.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-johanna-henrich">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="H_da@IETF121" srcset="
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin1_hu13501720516382093915.webp 400w,
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin1_hu17501611263548050124.webp 760w,
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin1_hu4076067445614435600.webp 1200w"
src="/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin1_hu13501720516382093915.webp"
width="760"
height="683"
loading="lazy" data-zoomable />&lt;/div>
&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Image ©: Johanna Henrich
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-johanna-henrich">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Dublin Convention Center" srcset="
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin2_hu15573151954013655298.webp 400w,
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin2_hu17045723289574231672.webp 760w,
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin2_hu5725797291102983458.webp 1200w"
src="/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin2_hu15573151954013655298.webp"
width="760"
height="570"
loading="lazy" data-zoomable />&lt;/div>
&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Image ©: Johanna Henrich
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-johanna-henrich">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Hackaton@IETF121" srcset="
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin3_hu6775000847676305778.webp 400w,
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin3_hu17327155716825964127.webp 760w,
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin3_hu14090310200751563479.webp 1200w"
src="/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin3_hu6775000847676305778.webp"
width="678"
height="760"
loading="lazy" data-zoomable />&lt;/div>
&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Image ©: Johanna Henrich
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-johanna-henrich">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Dublin impressions" srcset="
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin4_hu13605436600739172958.webp 400w,
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin4_hu15107992244754884424.webp 760w,
/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin4_hu14462442235763723863.webp 1200w"
src="/post/2024-11-01-ietf-meeting-121-dublin/dublin4_hu13605436600739172958.webp"
width="760"
height="518"
loading="lazy" data-zoomable />&lt;/div>
&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Image ©: Johanna Henrich
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Rump Session at ECOC 2024</title><link>/post/2024-09-22-ecoc-rump-session/</link><pubDate>Thu, 24 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2024-09-22-ecoc-rump-session/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 24 September 2024, Johanna Henrich accepted an invitation to take part in a rump session at the &lt;a href="https://www.ecoc2024.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">European Conference on Optical Communication (ECOC) 2024&lt;/a>. The session dealt with the pros and cons of post-quantum cryptography and quantum key distribution, and the extent to which they can be used in combination to reliably protect us from future attacks by quantum computers.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>ECOC is Europe&amp;rsquo;s leading conference on optical communications with representatives from science and research. It consists of a broad exhibition and a parallel conference and took place this year from 22 to 26 September in Frankfurt am Main.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
&lt;figure id="figure-image-169-ecoc-2024-impressionshttpswwwecoc2024orgabout-ecocimpressions">
&lt;div class="d-flex justify-content-center">
&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="ECOC Opening" srcset="
/post/2024-09-22-ecoc-rump-session/ECOC-23Sep2024_hu3394939190369216370.webp 400w,
/post/2024-09-22-ecoc-rump-session/ECOC-23Sep2024_hu12264301975870590358.webp 760w,
/post/2024-09-22-ecoc-rump-session/ECOC-23Sep2024_hu2388086254709085923.webp 1200w"
src="/post/2024-09-22-ecoc-rump-session/ECOC-23Sep2024_hu3394939190369216370.webp"
width="760"
height="507"
loading="lazy" data-zoomable />&lt;/div>
&lt;/div>&lt;figcaption>
Image ©: &lt;a href="https://www.ecoc2024.org/about-ecoc/impressions/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ECOC 2024 IMPRESSIONS&lt;/a>
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>How to Respect Bystanders' Privacy in Smart Homes - A Co-Creation Study</title><link>/publication/2024-nordchi-hahn/</link><pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2024 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2024-nordchi-hahn/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>As technology advances, homes become more digitalized and evolve into smart homes. Bystanders, e.g. guests in smart homes, are often unaware of the smart home devices and the associated privacy risks that make them especially vulnerable. However, so far there is limited research on how the guests can be made aware of smart home devices in the household and how their resulting privacy preferences can be addressed while respecting the smart home owners’ preferences as well. To close this gap, we conducted three co-creation workshops with ten participants (N=10) developing various design solutions. Through a thematic analysis of our data, we identified design solutions for smart home devices and beyond, like higher-level applications for regulating privacy and inherent responsibility. We recommend a multi-modal approach focusing not only on the design of the devices but also on the higher-level management of privacy in smart homes.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Wir begrüßen Sara im Team</title><link>/post/2024-new-member-sara/</link><pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2024-new-member-sara/</guid><description>&lt;p>Wir freuen uns, dass Sara Hahn zum 1.10. unsere Gruppe verstärkt. Sara hat einen Master in
Psychologie und wird sich im Projekt PIONEER mit psychologischen Bedürfnisse der Nutzer im
Kontext von Privatsphäre und Vertrauen im Internet befassen.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Willkommen, Sara.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Unser Beitrag auf dem Usable Security and Privacy Workshop (MuC 2024)</title><link>/post/2024-08-paper-muc-usp/</link><pubDate>Wed, 28 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2024-08-paper-muc-usp/</guid><description>&lt;p>Unser Beitrag &amp;ldquo;Pass auf! - Child-Oriented Cyber Safety &amp;amp; Security Educational Content&amp;rdquo; von Karen Bopp, Andreas Heinemann und
Karen Renaud wird am 3. September auf dem 10. Usable Security und Privacy Workshop am KIT in Karlsruhe im Rahmen der Konferenz &amp;ldquo;Mensch und Computer 2024&amp;rdquo; vorgestellt.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Diese Arbeit basiert auf den Ergebnissen der Masterarbeit von Karen Bopp.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Pass auf! - Child-Oriented Cyber Safety &amp; Security Educational Content</title><link>/publication/2024-muc-usp-ws-bopp-passauf/</link><pubDate>Mon, 26 Aug 2024 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2024-muc-usp-ws-bopp-passauf/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>A significant number of online users are underage. Hence, their caregivers and the children themselves should know how to keep themselves safe and secure online. Our aim is to understand which cyber risks children and parents identify through independent research, whether these cyber risks are in line with the state of research and official recommendations and whether risk informed learning materials for children, parents and teachers would be beneficial. We identified a list of cyber risks that affect children online. We examined German advisory websites and research publications to determine coverage of these. We then developed a website to provide comprehensive coverage specifically for German children, which we evaluated with a sample of children, their parents and teachers. German advisory websites, official bodies and researchers do not agree on what is considered a cyber risk for children. Researchers mention many risks that are not mentioned by advisory websites. Targeted risk-informed learning content should improve the situation. This research is a first step towards providing German children, their parents, and teachers with coherent, up-to-date and easily understandable advice about online safety and security risks and the mitigations that can be used to prevent them. More cooperation between stakeholders is urgently needed ensure children are protected.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>IT-Sicherheit aus Nutzerinnen- und Nutzersicht</title><link>/publication/2024-nomos-margraf-usec/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2024-nomos-margraf-usec/</guid><description/></item><item><title>2 Jobs for Student Assistants</title><link>/post/2024-07-30-offering-hiwi/</link><pubDate>Tue, 30 Jul 2024 04:12:53 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2024-07-30-offering-hiwi/</guid><description>&lt;p>Wir bieten zwei Stellen für studentische Hilfskräfte. Obwohl beide Tätigkeiten einen Bezug zu IT-Sicherheit und unserem Forschungsfeld &lt;em>Quantum Key Distribution Networks&lt;/em> haben, unterscheiden sich die Aufgaben stark. Wenn Du Dinge gut Ordnen und Strukturieren kannst und ein kleines Organisationstalent bist, kannst du gerne versuchen, für Ordnung in unseren Literaturdschungel zu sorgen. Wenn du eher Typ Programmierer und Tüftler bist, darfst Du dich an unseren Prototypen wagen.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Unten findest Du die Links zu unseren Angeboten. Melde Dich bei Interesse gerne per Mail bei &lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/author/johanna-henrich/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Wir freuen uns auf Dich.&lt;/p>
&lt;ol>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/offerings/2024-07-hiwi-sok-qkdn//" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Systematization of Knowledge (SoK): Architecture and Communication Patterns in QKD Networks&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/offerings/2024-07-hiwo-qkdn-prototype//" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prototype development and benchmarking for secure key forwarding in QKDN&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ol>
&lt;p>&lt;em>English:&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>We offer two positions for student assistants. Although both jobs are related to IT security and our research area Quantum Key Distribution Networks, the tasks are quite different. If you are good at organizing and structuring things and have a talent for keeping things tidy, you are welcome to try to keep our literature jungle in order. If you are more of a programmer and tinkerer, you can try your hand at our prototype.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Below you will find the links to our offers. If you are interested, please send an email to &lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/author/johanna-henrich/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Johanna Henrich&lt;/a>.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>We are looking forward to hearing from you.&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;ol>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;em>&lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/offerings/2024-07-hiwi-sok-qkdn//" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Systematization of Knowledge (SoK): Architecture and Communication Patterns in QKD Networks&lt;/a>&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;em>&lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/offerings/2024-07-hiwo-qkdn-prototype//" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Prototype Development and Benchmarking for Secure Key Forwarding in QKDN&lt;/a>&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ol></description></item><item><title>PIONEER</title><link>/project/pioneer/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jul 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/project/pioneer/</guid><description>&lt;p>The ATHENE PIONEER (A PrIvacy companion for mOtivatioN and knowlEdge transfER) project is an interdisciplinary project that addresses one of the key challenges in this century for users: remaining control over their private data.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>PIONEER aims to empower users in their digital sovereignty by providing them with the necessary knowledge and motivating them to acquire and apply competencies in their everyday digital lives.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This will be realized through the user-centered development of a digital privacy companion in the form of a mobile app in which users can (1) acquire the necessary knowledge about digital contexts enabling them to make self-determined and informed decisions about how to handle their data.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Furthermore, (2) through the application of psychological theories in the design, the digital privacy companion supports users in showing and maintaining privacy-aware behavior in the long-term.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Lastly, (3) different user groups (e.g., elderly people, adolescents) are taken into account to derive and consider specifics, such as different psychological needs that drive human behavior or different knowledge levels, resulting in different user requirements.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Additionally, PIONEER employs a participatory co-creation process, integrating insights from both privacy experts and lay users.&lt;/p>
&lt;h4 id="contact">Contact&lt;/h4>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="/author/sara-hahn">Sara Hahn&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>PMMP-PQC Migration Management Process</title><link>/publication/2024-eicc-vonnethen-pmmp/</link><pubDate>Sun, 16 Jun 2024 05:02:36 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2024-eicc-vonnethen-pmmp/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Organizations have to plan on migrating to quantum-resilient cryptographic measures, also known as PQC. However, this is a difficult task, and to the best of our knowledge, there is no generalized approach to manage such a complex migration for cryptography used in IT systems that explicitly integrates into organizations’ steering mechanisms and control systems. We present PMMP, a risk-based process for managing the migration of organizations from classic cryptography to PQC and establishing crypto-agility. Having completed the initial design phase, as well as a theoretical evaluation, we now intend to promote PMMP. Practitioners are encouraged to join the effort in order to enable a comprehensive practical evaluation and further development.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Ways for confidential and authenticated hop-by-hop key establishment in QKDN</title><link>/publication/2023-gi-sicherheit-johanna-phd/</link><pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2024 04:47:14 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2023-gi-sicherheit-johanna-phd/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Asymmetric cryptography, specifically key exchange and digital signatures, enables secure
digital communication. However, sufficiently powerful Quantum Computers, which could
be available within a few years , would be able to break classical primitives like
Elliptic-Curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) and RSA in polynomial time. Moreover, the
„harvest-then-decrypt“-attack poses the danger that stored encrypted data can be
decrypted later. Thus, alternative approaches are urgently needed. Besides Post Quantum
Cryptography (PQC), which is based on mathematical problems, Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) uses quantum effects, to establish keys in an information-theoretically
secure way. Nevertheless, there are no reliable QKD modules that bridge distances
of more than 150 km. Therefore, a QKD Network (QKDN) uses a concatenation of
QKD links. End users are connected to each other via a series of QKD nodes performing
a hop-by-hop key forwarding. All nodes involved have access to the final shared secret.
If a node cannot be trusted the security of the system is no longer guaranteed. Physical
protection or key hybridization can mitigate this risk, where hybridization refers to the
combination of QKD and PQC. By using both schemes appropriately, the security objectives
are met as long as at least one of the schemes used has not been compromised.
Nonetheless, there is a lack of concrete concepts and analyzes to enable a secure and
efficient key forwarding process. In the following, ’secure’ implies the security objectives of
confidentiality and authenticity. ’Efficient’ refers to the time taken to complete the process,
the amount of data transferred and the amount of computing required. The analyses available
often only consider specific sub-processes, e.g., forwarding between two directly adjacent
nodes. The integration into the entire system and its resulting effects are disregarded. A
systematic comparison of different options is missing. When implementing a QKDN, it is
unclear which variant is suitable for one’s own intentions. This PhD project aims to address
the problem by defining the key establishment process, analyzing security requirements,
designing and implementing corresponding schemes, and evaluating these approaches.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>On Criteria and Tooling for Cryptographic Inventories</title><link>/publication/2024-gi-sicherheit-schmitt-cdt/</link><pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 05:01:40 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2024-gi-sicherheit-schmitt-cdt/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>When cryptography becomes insecure, a migration to new schemes is required. Often the migration process is very complicated, but the time available is very limited. Only if the used cryptographic algorithms, protocols and configurations are known can a system be efficiently and fully adapted to changed security situations. This creates the need for a crypto-inventory that gathers this knowledge. Consequently, the question arises what criteria a crypto-inventory must fulfill to support this adaptation. It also highlights the need for tools to assist compilation. We therefore conducted a literature survey and extracted key requirements. Missing content was supplemented by expanding existing requirements or adding new ones. Furthermore, appropriate metrics were assigned to assess the fulfillment of the requirements for a certain crypto-inventory implementation. Regarding the tooling, we identified five major areas of interest — installed software, connected hardware, communication, stored data and source code scanning — and provide prototypes for semi-automatic creation of crypto-inventories for three of them. This provides organizations with a starting point to understand their cryptographic landscape as a prerequisite for crypto-agility and crypto-migration. However, theoretical design and prototypes have not yet been evaluated. This will be done as a follow-up to this work. All types of organizations are invited to participate.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Toward Next Generation Quantum-Safe eIDs and eMRTDs: A Survey</title><link>/publication/2024-embedcs-alnahawi-eid-survey/</link><pubDate>Sat, 16 Mar 2024 05:00:48 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2024-embedcs-alnahawi-eid-survey/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Security mechanisms of Electronic Personal Documents (eCards) depend on (asymmetric) cryptography that is and always has been subject to the threat of compromise, be it from conventional attacks or quantum computers. With Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), we now have alternative building blocks at hand that can be leveraged to protect against both kind of attacks. Thus, PQC should be incorporated into eCard ecosystems, yet it is not clear how this is done best. In the work at hand, we review the state of currently used crypto-systems for eCard security, as well as their possible quantum-secure replacements. Further, we identify and categorize respective challenges that need to be addressed, present and assess existing approaches for their solution, and formulate research questions for open issues. By providing an overview of the situation, we help unraveling the issue and pave the way toward quantum-safe electronic Identity Documents and electronic Machine-Readable Travel Documents.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>2 neue Themen für Abschlussarbeiten online (DE)</title><link>/post/2024-01-23-db-systel/</link><pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2024 04:12:53 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2024-01-23-db-systel/</guid><description>&lt;p>In Kooperation mit der DB Systel bieten wir die folgenden zwei Abschlussarbeiten an&lt;/p>
&lt;ol>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/offerings/2024-01-thesis-threat-modelling-dbsystel/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Einbettung von automatisiertem Threat Modelling ins Risikomanagement&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/offerings/2024-01-thesis-pentest-report-dbsystel/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nutzerzentrierte Qualitätssteigerung im Berichtswesen von Penetrationtests&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;/li>
&lt;/ol></description></item><item><title>Einbettung von automatisiertem Threat Modelling ins Risikomanagement</title><link>/offerings/2024-01-thesis-threat-modelling-dbsystel/</link><pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2024-01-thesis-threat-modelling-dbsystel/</guid><description>&lt;hr>
&lt;h3 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Im Unternehmenskontext des Teams &lt;em>Application Security Specialists&lt;/em> der DB Systel soll im Rahmen des dort implementierten &lt;em>Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC)&lt;/em> sowie des zugehörigen &lt;em>Information Security Management System (ISMS)&lt;/em> ein Thread Modelling weitgehend automatisiert und eingebettet werden.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Hierbei soll die Lösung sowohl das agile Vorgehen im SDLC berücksichtigen sowie einen Mehrwert und eine Arbeitserleichterung für die verschiedenen Stakeholder (Development-Team, Product Owner, Security Architect, CISO) bieten.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Das Ziel der Arbeit ist die Erarbeitung eines Vorgehensmodells zur Aufbereitung von technischen Risiken aus einem Thread Modelling Prozess für das Risikomanagement gemäß eines Information Security Management System (ISMS). Hierbei soll aus technischer Sicht eine Export- und Report-Schnittstelle aus Basis von IriusRisk als Web Service implementiert werden.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Recherche:
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Wie kann kontinuierliches Threat Modeling in einem agilen Entwicklungsprozess realisiert werden?&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Wie kann Risiko Management gemäß ISMS realisiert werden?&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Erarbeitung eines Vorgehensmodells zur Aggregation von technischen Risiken aus dem Thread Modeling für ein Risiko Management gemäß ISMS&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Basis von IriusRisk: Design, Implementierung und Test einer Export- und Report-Schnittstelle&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Evaluation des Tool-gestützten Vorgehensmodells hinsichtlich Usability, Effizienz, Effektivität und Wirkungsgrad&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Grundkenntnisse in IT-Sicherheit und sicherer Software-Entwicklung&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Programmierkenntnisse&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Docker-Kenntnisse sind von Vorteil&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Spaß an Literaturarbeit und theoretischen Konzepten&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="literatur-einstieg">Literatur (Einstieg)&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Izar Tarandach and Matthew J. Coles: &amp;ldquo;Threat Modeling: A Practical Guide for Development Teams&amp;rdquo;. O’Reilly Media, Inc. (November 2020), ISBN: 9781492056553&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://github.com/Autodesk/continuous-threat-modeling/blob/master/Continuous_Threat_Modeling_Handbook.md" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Continuous Threat Modeling Handbook&lt;/a>, via GitHub&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Scott, F. &lt;a href="https://www.iriusrisk.com/resources-blog/introduction-to-the-open-threat-model-standard" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&amp;ldquo;Introduction to the Open Threat Model standard&amp;rdquo;&lt;/a>, 2022, IrusRisk Blog&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://github.com/iriusrisk/OpenThreatModel" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Open Threat Modeling Format (OTM)&lt;/a>, via GitHub&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;!-- - [IriusRisk](https://www.iriusrisk.com) Website -->
&lt;h3 id="start">Start&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>nach Absprache&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Diese Arbeit wird in Kooperation mit dem Team &lt;strong>Application Security Specialists&lt;/strong> der DB Systel in Frankfurt/M durchgeführt&lt;/em>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Weitere Informationen und Kontakt&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="/author/andreas-heinemann/">Andreas Heinemann&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Nutzerzentrierte Qualitätssteigerung im Berichtswesen von Penetrationtests</title><link>/offerings/2024-01-thesis-pentest-report-dbsystel/</link><pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/offerings/2024-01-thesis-pentest-report-dbsystel/</guid><description>&lt;hr>
&lt;h3 id="motivation">Motivation&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Im Unternehmenskontext des Teams &lt;em>Application Security Specialists&lt;/em> der DB Systel muss für jeden Penetrationtest ein
Abschlussbericht erstellt werden. Hierzu wird eine Vorlage eines Reporting-Tools verwendet. Der Nutzen und die Qualität eines Berichts bleiben jedoch hinter den Erwartungen zurück. So fehlen klare Vorgaben und Guidelines an das Design und die Struktur. Darüber hinaus ist unklar, welche Nutzergruppen einen Bericht in welcher Form verwenden und ob die Ergebnisse eines Pentests hierbei optimal kommuniziert werden und die gewünschten Handlungen nach sich ziehen.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="ziel">Ziel&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Das Ziel der Arbeit ist den unternehmensweiten Wirkungsgrad von Abschlussberichten von Penetrationstests zu erhöhen.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Hierzu könnte die Verbesserung der Verständlichkeit, die Vereinheitlichung von Vorgaben und die Reduzierung des eigentlichen Schreibaufwands durch technische Unterstützung gehören.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="aufgaben">Aufgaben&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Literaturrecherche zu Berichtswesen im Pentesting&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Recherche von Test- und Bewertungsmethoden zur Verständlichkeit von Berichten&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Einarbeitung in Usability/UX von technischen Dokumentationssystemen&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Recherche von alternativen Aufbereitungsformen von Berichten. Schlagworte: &lt;em>information dashboards&lt;/em>, &lt;em>visual analytics&lt;/em>, etc.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="voraussetzungen">Voraussetzungen&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Grundlegende Kenntnisse im Pentesting&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse des &lt;a href="https://owasp.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">OWASP&lt;/a> Projects&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kenntnisse des &lt;a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/v4-0/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Kenntisse der &lt;a href="https://www.cve.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)&lt;/a> Systematik&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Erfahrungen im Schreiben von technischen Berichten&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="literatur-einstieg">Literatur (Einstieg)&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>M. N. Zakaria et al., &amp;ldquo;A Review of Standardization for Penetration Testing Reports and Documents,&amp;rdquo; 2019 6th International Conference on Research and Innovation in Information Systems (ICRIIS)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Professional_and_Technical_Writing/Design/Usability" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Professional and Technical Writing/Design/Usability&lt;/a>, WIKIBOOKS&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Parker, Kesi, &amp;ldquo;&lt;a href="https://medium.com/@kesiparker/usability-in-technical-documentation-8424e0e297dc" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Usability in Technical Documentation&lt;/a>&amp;rdquo; 2018, Medium&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h3 id="start">Start&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>nach Absprache&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Diese Arbeit wird in Kooperation mit dem Team &lt;strong>Application Security Specialists&lt;/strong> der DB Systel in Frankfurt/M durchgeführt&lt;/em>.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Weitere Informationen und Kontakt&lt;/em>&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="/author/andreas-heinemann/">Andreas Heinemann&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Privacy Policy</title><link>/privacy/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><guid>/privacy/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;strong>Effective Date:&lt;/strong> January 1, 2024
&lt;strong>Last Updated:&lt;/strong> March 22, 2026&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="1-controller">1. Controller&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>The controller responsible for data processing on this website is:&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Prof. Dr. Andreas Heinemann&lt;/strong>
c/o Fachbereich Informatik
Hochschule Darmstadt – University of Applied Sciences
Schöfferstr. 3
D-64295 Darmstadt
Germany&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Email:&lt;/strong> andreas DOT heinemann AT h-da DOT de
&lt;strong>Phone:&lt;/strong> +49 6151 533 68482&lt;/p>
&lt;p>For data protection inquiries at Hochschule Darmstadt, you may also contact the institutional Data Protection Officer:&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Data Protection Officer of Hochschule Darmstadt&lt;/strong>
Hochschule Darmstadt
Schöfferstr. 3
D-64295 Darmstadt
&lt;strong>Email:&lt;/strong> datenschutz AT h-da DOT de&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="2-overview-of-data-processing">2. Overview of Data Processing&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>We take the protection of your personal data seriously. This privacy policy explains what data we collect when you visit our website, how we use it, and what rights you have under the &lt;strong>General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)&lt;/strong> and the &lt;strong>German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG)&lt;/strong>.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="3-hosting-and-server-log-files">3. Hosting and Server Log Files&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>This website is hosted on infrastructure provided by Hochschule Darmstadt. When you access this website, your browser automatically transmits certain technical data, which is stored in server log files:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>IP address (anonymized where possible)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Date and time of access&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Requested URL / page&lt;/li>
&lt;li>HTTP status code&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Amount of data transferred&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Referring URL (the page from which you arrived)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Browser type and version&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Operating system&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Legal basis:&lt;/strong> Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR — legitimate interest in ensuring the secure and efficient operation of the website.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Retention period:&lt;/strong> Server log files are automatically deleted after &lt;strong>30 days&lt;/strong>, unless retention is required for security incident investigation.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="4-cookies">4. Cookies&lt;/h2>
&lt;h3 id="41-what-are-cookies">4.1 What Are Cookies?&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Cookies are small text files stored on your device by your web browser. They help websites function properly and can improve user experience.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="42-cookies-used-on-this-website">4.2 Cookies Used on This Website&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>This website uses only &lt;strong>technically necessary cookies&lt;/strong>:&lt;/p>
&lt;table>
&lt;thead>
&lt;tr>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Cookie&lt;/th>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Purpose&lt;/th>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Duration&lt;/th>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Type&lt;/th>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;/thead>
&lt;tbody>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;code>cookie_consent&lt;/code>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Stores your cookie consent preference&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">365 days&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Necessary&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;/tbody>
&lt;/table>
&lt;p>We do &lt;strong>not&lt;/strong> use tracking cookies, advertising cookies, or third-party analytics cookies.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Legal basis:&lt;/strong> Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR — legitimate interest in providing a functional website. For the consent cookie: Art. 6(1)(a) GDPR.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="43-managing-cookies">4.3 Managing Cookies&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>You can configure your browser to block or delete cookies at any time. Please note that disabling cookies may affect website functionality. Instructions for common browsers:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/95647" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Google Chrome&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/cookies-information-websites-store-on-your-computer" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mozilla Firefox&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/manage-cookies-sfri11471/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Safari&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/manage-cookies-in-microsoft-edge-168dab11-0753-043d-7c16-ede5947fc64d" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Microsoft Edge&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="5-contact-forms-and-email">5. Contact Forms and Email&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>If you contact us via email or a contact form, the data you provide (name, email address, message content) will be processed solely for the purpose of handling your inquiry.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Legal basis:&lt;/strong> Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR (pre-contractual measures) or Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interest in responding to inquiries).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Retention period:&lt;/strong> Data is deleted once the inquiry has been fully resolved, unless legal retention obligations apply.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="6-third-party-services-and-external-content">6. Third-Party Services and External Content&lt;/h2>
&lt;h3 id="61-google-fonts-local">6.1 Google Fonts (Local)&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>This website uses Google Fonts that are &lt;strong>hosted locally&lt;/strong> on our server. No connection to Google servers is made, and no data is transmitted to Google.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="62-external-links">6.2 External Links&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Our website contains links to external websites. We have no control over their content or data protection practices. Please refer to the privacy policies of the respective external sites.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="7-oauth-and-single-sign-on-sso">7. OAuth and Single Sign-On (SSO)&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>If you access services operated by our research group that use OAuth or Single Sign-On authentication, the following data may be processed:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Username / email address provided by the identity provider&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Authentication tokens (temporary)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Session identifiers&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Legal basis:&lt;/strong> Art. 6(1)(b) GDPR — necessary for providing the requested service.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Retention period:&lt;/strong> Session data is deleted upon logout or session expiration. Authentication logs may be retained for up to &lt;strong>90 days&lt;/strong> for security purposes.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>For the specific privacy policy of each service, please refer to the documentation of the respective application.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="8-data-security">8. Data Security&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>We implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect your personal data against unauthorized access, loss, destruction, or alteration, in accordance with Art. 32 GDPR. These measures include:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>TLS/SSL encryption for data in transit&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Regular security updates and patch management&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Access controls and authentication mechanisms&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Regular security assessments&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="9-your-rights-under-gdpr">9. Your Rights Under GDPR&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Under the General Data Protection Regulation, you have the following rights:&lt;/p>
&lt;table>
&lt;thead>
&lt;tr>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Right&lt;/th>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Article&lt;/th>
&lt;th style="text-align: left">Description&lt;/th>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;/thead>
&lt;tbody>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Right of Access&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Art. 15 GDPR&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">You may request information about your personal data we process.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Right to Rectification&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Art. 16 GDPR&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">You may request correction of inaccurate personal data.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Right to Erasure&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Art. 17 GDPR&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">You may request deletion of your personal data, subject to legal retention obligations.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Right to Restriction&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Art. 18 GDPR&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">You may request restriction of processing under certain conditions.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Right to Data Portability&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Art. 20 GDPR&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">You may request your data in a structured, machine-readable format.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Right to Object&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Art. 21 GDPR&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">You may object to processing based on legitimate interests at any time.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;tr>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">&lt;strong>Right to Withdraw Consent&lt;/strong>&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">Art. 7(3) GDPR&lt;/td>
&lt;td style="text-align: left">You may withdraw any given consent at any time with future effect.&lt;/td>
&lt;/tr>
&lt;/tbody>
&lt;/table>
&lt;p>To exercise your rights, please contact us using the details provided in Section 1.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="10-right-to-lodge-a-complaint">10. Right to Lodge a Complaint&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>You have the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority if you believe that the processing of your personal data violates the GDPR.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The competent supervisory authority for Hochschule Darmstadt is:&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Der Hessische Beauftragte für Datenschutz und Informationsfreiheit&lt;/strong>
Postfach 3163
65021 Wiesbaden
Germany&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>Phone:&lt;/strong> +49 611 1408-0
&lt;strong>Email:&lt;/strong> poststelle AT datenschutz DOT hessen DOT de
&lt;strong>Website:&lt;/strong> &lt;a href="https://datenschutz.hessen.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://datenschutz.hessen.de&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;h2 id="11-changes-to-this-privacy-policy">11. Changes to This Privacy Policy&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>We reserve the right to update this privacy policy to reflect changes in our data processing practices or legal requirements. The current version is always available on this page. We encourage you to review this policy periodically.&lt;/p>
&lt;hr>
&lt;p>&lt;em>This privacy policy was last updated on March 22, 2026.&lt;/em>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Paper accepted at ISC 2023</title><link>/post/paper-isc-2023/</link><pubDate>Wed, 11 Oct 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/paper-isc-2023/</guid><description>&lt;p>Our paper &amp;ldquo;Performance Impact of PQC KEMs on TLS 1.3 under Varying Network
Characteristics&amp;rdquo; by Johanna Henrich, Andreas Heinemann, Alexander Wiesmaier and Nicolai Schmidt will be presented at the &lt;a href="https://isc23.cs.rug.nl/docs/home/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">26th Information Security Conference (ISC)&lt;/a> (ISC - 2023) on November 15/16/17th 2023, Groningen, Netherlands.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This work is based on the results of Johanna Henrichs&amp;rsquo;s Master&amp;rsquo;s thesis.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>9. Usable Security and Privacy Workshop</title><link>/post/2023-08-29-muc-workshop/</link><pubDate>Tue, 29 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2023-08-29-muc-workshop/</guid><description>&lt;p>On Sept. 03, 2023, the &lt;a href="https://das.h-brs.de/workshops/usp-muc-2023/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">9th Usable Security and Privacy Workshop&lt;/a> will take place as part of the &lt;a href="https://muc2023.mensch-und-computer.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mensch und Computer 23&lt;/a> in Rapperswil (SG). &lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/author/andreas-heinemann/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Andreas Heinemann&lt;/a> is one of the co-organisers of this workshop.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Workshop on crypto-agility and migration</title><link>/post/2023-08-01-workshop_on_crypto-agility_and_migration/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2023-08-01-workshop_on_crypto-agility_and_migration/</guid><description>&lt;p>We will host a workshop on crypto-agility and migration on September 19, 2023. &lt;a href="https://camm.h-da.io/workshop/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Details&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>UCS@1st Research Day / FBI</title><link>/post/2023-07-12-research-day-computer-science/</link><pubDate>Wed, 12 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2023-07-12-research-day-computer-science/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://impact.h-da.de/en/research-day-computer-science" target="_blank" rel="noopener">An article about the research day can be found here&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Performance Impact of PQC KEMs on TLS 1.3 Under Varying Network Characteristics</title><link>/publication/2023-infosec-henrich-pqc-kem/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Jun 2023 05:00:35 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2023-infosec-henrich-pqc-kem/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Widely used asymmetric primitives such as RSA or Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH), which enable authentication and key exchange, could be broken by Quantum Computers (QCs) in the coming years. Quantum-safe alternatives are urgently needed. However, a thorough investigation of these schemes is crucial to achieve sufficient levels of security, performance, and integrability in different application contexts. The integration into Transport Layer Security (TLS) plays an important role, as this security protocol is used in about 90% of today’s Internet connections and relies heavily on asymmetric cryptography. In this work, we evaluate different Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) key establishment schemes in TLS 1.3 by extending the framework of Paquin et al.. We analyze the TLS handshake performance under variation of network parameters such as packet loss. This allows us to investigate the suitability of PQC KEMs in specific application contexts. We observe that Kyber and other structured lattice-based algorithms achieve very good overall performance and partially beat classical schemes. Other approaches such as FrodoKEM, HQC and BIKE show individual disadvantages. For these algorithms, there is a clear performance decrease when increasing the security level or using a hybrid implementation, e.g., a combination with ECDH. This is especially true for FrodoKEM, which, however, meets high security requirements in general. It becomes clear that performance is strongly influenced by the underlying network processes, which must be taken into account when selecting PQC algorithms.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Best Poster Award at EICC 2023</title><link>/post/2023-06-poster-eicc/</link><pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2023-06-poster-eicc/</guid><description>&lt;p>Our poster contribution to the EICC2023 titled &amp;ldquo;Crytpo-agile Design and Testbed for QKD-Networks&amp;rdquo; by Johanna Henrich, Andreas Heinemann, Martin Stiemerling &amp;amp; Fabian Seidl was honored with the best poster award.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>
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&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Group photo" srcset="
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Johanna
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&amp;#x1f44f;&amp;#x1f44f;
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&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Crypto-Agile Design and Testbed for QKD-Networks</title><link>/publication/2023-eicc-henrich-demoquandt/</link><pubDate>Thu, 15 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2023-eicc-henrich-demoquandt/</guid><description>&lt;!-- Supplementary notes can be added here, including [code and math](https://sourcethemes.com/academic/docs/writing-markdown-latex/). -->
&lt;p>
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&lt;div class="w-100" >&lt;img alt="Poster at EICC 2023" srcset="
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EICC &amp;lsquo;23 Poster
&lt;/figcaption>&lt;/figure>
&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Cybersecurity Kids - Crossing the street online: An evaluation of learnability of age-appropriate educational content on cybersecurity &amp; -safety</title><link>/theses/2024-bopp/</link><pubDate>Mon, 17 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/theses/2024-bopp/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>The Internet is full of false claims about supposedly effective preventive- and countermeasures to cybersafety and cybersecurity risks, and the majority of computer users are not well-informed on this topic. The average user utilizes the Internet to educate themselves and, among other things, to answer questions that their children ask. But when it comes to cybersecurity threats, there are plenty of risk measure recommendations on the Internet, which can be confusing. Of the few sites that provide practical measures, there are only a few that comply with current German standards. So, how are German adults (parents and teachers) supposed to qualitatively educate themselves, apply this knowledge and also pass it on to their children? Additionally, how are children, who may be just learning to research, supposed to get reliable cybersafety and cybersecurity knowledge?&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This work creates a unified platform in which online risks and coherent recommendations on measures are presented in an age-appropriate manner. In doing so, the abilities of the children’s respective development level must be taken into account in order to create content that can be understood by all user groups (children, guardians, and teachers).&lt;/p>
&lt;p>To this end, the informational and educational content will be embedded in a developed website, where the content will be communicated audiovisually to children and to adults in textual form. Practical examples, in the form of pictures, in order to facilitate constructivist learning, are given. Finally, the extent to which the content was able to influence the knowledge of adults and children in the field of cybersecurity risks is measured, by conducting a within-groups study consisting of two online surveys.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This study expands upon the work done by &lt;a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ICS-07-2020-0115/full/html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Renaud and Prior&lt;/a> and uses the results obtained on risks and their age relevancies for children. Recommendations from numerous German ministries and government agencies were consulted to verify the accuracy and relevance of the proposed measures from the researched websites.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Towards a maturity model for crypto-agility assessment</title><link>/publication/2023-fps-2022-hohm-camm/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 Apr 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2023-fps-2022-hohm-camm/</guid><description>&lt;!-- Supplementary notes can be added here, including [code and math](https://sourcethemes.com/academic/docs/writing-markdown-latex/). --></description></item><item><title>Article in Steinbeis Transfer Magazine</title><link>/post/2023-01-24/</link><pubDate>Tue, 24 Jan 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2023-01-24/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="title">Title&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>Good Usability Delivers Tighter Security&lt;/p>
&lt;h1 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>The modern world of work would be almost inconceivable without the support of IT systems. Connected systems and IT solutions also continue to make inroads into our private lives. Consider, for example, intelligent heating controls (smart home systems), which have gained in importance in the current energy crisis. This trend is being accelerated by more and more people coming into direct contact with IT solutions. Among other areas, Professor Dr. Andreas Heinemann (Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences/InCUPS, his Steinbeis Transfer Center for Internet Communication, Usability, Privacy, and Security) specializes in IT security and usability. This involves investigating how to mitigate cyber risk.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>LEAK</title><link>/project/leak/</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/project/leak/</guid><description>&lt;p>The ATHENE Leak project addresses side-channel-analysis-attacks (SCA) by developing a so-called natural leakage model, that is closer to the hardware than standard leakage models and thereby more precise and effective.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>As full electrical simulations of complex hardware are usually to resource-intensive, common leakage models
abstract the hardware on the register-transfer-level (RTL) and are thereby much more resource-friendly during simulations.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>A natural leakage model combines the resource-friendliness with measured behavior of the hardware. Based on this model, the project aims to further adapt and develop performance-optimized countermeasures against SCA on PQC-Algorithms implemented on the RISC-V platform.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The intended project results (a natural leakage models and optimizations) can be used to support hardware engineers during the development, hardening and testing of hardware-based security solutions. Thereby the number of prototypes before final rollout of new hardware will be reduced, speeding up the development process and saving costs in the development and hardening process.&lt;/p>
&lt;h4 id="contact">Contact&lt;/h4>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="/author/nicolai-schmitt">Nicolai Schmitt&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Paper accepted at FPS - 2022</title><link>/post/paper-fps-2022/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Nov 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/paper-fps-2022/</guid><description>&lt;p>Our paper &amp;ldquo;Towards a maturity model for crypto-agility assessment&amp;rdquo; by Julian Hohm, Andreas Heinemann and Alexander Wiesmaier will be presented at the &lt;a href="https://www.fps-2022.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">15th International Symposium on Foundations &amp;amp; Practice of Security&lt;/a> (FPS - 2022) on December 12/13/14th 2022, Ottawa, Canada.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This work is based on the results of Julian Hohm&amp;rsquo;s Master&amp;rsquo;s thesis. Check out more details on &lt;a href="https://camm.h-da.io" target="_blank" rel="noopener">CAMM&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>2. Platz beim CAST-Förderpreis IT-Sicherheit 2022 (DE)</title><link>/post/2022-10-cast-johanna/</link><pubDate>Tue, 11 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2022-10-cast-johanna/</guid><description>&lt;p>Am 10. Oktober fand die Finalrundes des CAST-Förderpreises IT-Sicherheit 2022 im Rahmen des Cybersicherheitsgipfel Hessen in Wiesbaden statt. Johanna Henrich belegte mit Ihrer Arbeit &amp;ldquo;Performanz Evaluation von PQC in TLS 1.3 unter variierenden Netzwerkcharakteristiken&amp;rdquo; den 2. Platz in der Kategorie &amp;ldquo;Beste Masterarbeiten&amp;rdquo;. Herzlichen Glückwunsch.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://cast-forum.de/presse/cast.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Zur Meldung des CAST e.V.&lt;/a>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Studentische Hilfskraft im Bereich PQC-Migration gesucht (DE)</title><link>/post/2022-09-offering-pqc/</link><pubDate>Sun, 25 Sep 2022 04:12:53 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/2022-09-offering-pqc/</guid><description>&lt;p>&lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/offerings/student-assistant-pqc-2022/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Weitere Details&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>UCS ist mit Projekt ELITE auf der Hannover Messe (DE)</title><link>/post/elite-hannover-messe-2022/</link><pubDate>Thu, 26 May 2022 06:20:43 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/elite-hannover-messe-2022/</guid><description>&lt;p>Hier geht es zum &lt;a href="https://www.tisim.de/elite-it-bedrohungen-auf-der-hannover-messe-2022-selbst-erleben/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Blockbeitrag&lt;/a> bei der &lt;a href="https://www.tisim.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Transferstelle IT-Sicherheit im Mittelstand&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Privatsphären-/ und Benutzbarkeits-fördernde Softwareentwicklungsprozesse für kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen</title><link>/theses/2022-konczewski/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 May 2022 09:29:56 +0000</pubDate><guid>/theses/2022-konczewski/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are dependent on the investigation of methods and development processes for software development in order to develop satisfactory applications for their end users. For this methods to integrate security, privacy, and usability are a central component. As the work of &lt;a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3470022" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bender et al.&lt;/a>, through a survey of publications, shows, there are currently no software development processes that are both suitable for SMEs and integrate the three criteria - security, privacy, and usability. This master thesis aims at counteracting this by proposing a privacy- and usability-enhancing software development process for SMEs.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>For this purpose, starting from the work of &lt;a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3470022" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bender et al.&lt;/a>, the approaches from the literature are considered in order to identify suitable processes and methods for the integration of the three criteria in the software development process.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>For the determination of the actually used methods, processes and possible requirements for a software development process from the point of view of SMEs, software developers from these SMEs are surveyd in the form of interviews. The findings from the literature research as well as the interviews with the developers of the SMEs are then compiled.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The interviews show that SMEs have special requirements for a software development process only in exceptional cases, but they do have a large diversity of projects. These disallow the meaningful formulation of a generally applicable software development process with concrete methods and techniques, since the choice of the suitable methods is to be made in dependence on the projects and their concrete context.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>So that the SMEs are able to integrate suitable methods in their software development process, 14 principles are formulated in the result of this master thesis. These principles can be used by the companies as a guideline for the integration of security, privacy and usability. In doing so, the principles are drawn from the methods and recommendations in the literature and the methods used by SMEs. The principles are placed in the combined process model, which results from the description of the software development pro- cesses by the interviewed participants.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>David Konczewski verteidigt erfolgreich seine Masterarbeit (DE)</title><link>/post/thesis-konczewski-2022/</link><pubDate>Wed, 25 May 2022 03:49:13 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/thesis-konczewski-2022/</guid><description>&lt;p>Im Rahmen des Abschlusskolloquiums hat Herr David Konczewski erfolgreich die Ergebnisse seiner Masterarbeit mit dem Titel
&lt;em>&amp;ldquo;Privatsphären-/ und Benutzbarkeits-fördernde Softwareentwicklungsprozesse für kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen&amp;rdquo;&lt;/em> vorgestellt und verteidigt. Herzlichen Glückwunsch.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung--abstract">Zusammenfassung / Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen (KMU) sind auf die Untersuchungen von Methoden und Entwicklungsprozessen für die Softwareentwicklung angewiesen, um mit ihren verfügbaren Ressourcen für ihre Endbenutzer zufriedenstellende Anwendungen zu entwickeln. Dafür sind Methoden zur Integration von Sicherheit, Privatsphäre und Benutzbarkeit zentraler Bestandteil. Wie die Arbeit von &lt;a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3470022" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bender et al.&lt;/a> durch eine Untersuchung der Publikationen zeigt, liegen aktuell keine Softwareentwicklungsprozesse vor, die sowohl für KMU geeignet sind als auch die Integration der drei Kriterien - Sicherheit, Privatsphäre sowie Benutzbarkeit - fördern. Diese Masterarbeit möchte diesem Umstand durch den Vorschlag eines privatsphären- und benutzbarkeitsfördernden Softwareentwicklungsprozess für KMU entgegenwirken.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Zu diesem Zweck werden ausgehend von der Arbeit von &lt;a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3470022" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bender et al.&lt;/a> die Ansätze aus der Literatur betrachtet, um so geeignete Prozesse und Methoden für die Integration der drei Kriterien in einen Softwareentwicklungsprozess zu identifizieren. Zur Ermittlung der tatsächlich eingesetzten Methoden, Prozesse sowie möglicher Anforderungen an einen Softwareent- wicklungsprozess aus Sicht von KMU werden Softwareentwickler aus eben diesen in Form von Interviews befragt. Die Erkenntnisse aus der Literaturrecherche sowie der Interviews mit den Entwicklern der KMU werden im Anschluss zusammengeführt.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Die Interviews zeigen, dass KMU zwar nur in Ausnahmefällen besondere Anforderungen an einen Softwareentwicklungsprozess stellen, jedoch einer großen Diversitiät von Projekten begegnen. Diese lassen die sinnvolle Formulierung eines allgemeingültigen Softwareentwicklungsprozesses mit konkreten Methoden und Techniken nicht zu, da die Wahl der geeigneten Methoden in starker Abhängigkeit von den Projekten und deren konkreten Kontext zu treffen ist.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Damit die KMU in der Lage sind, geeignete Methoden in ihren Softwareentwicklungsprozess zu integrieren, werden im Ergebnis dieser Masterarbeit 14 Grundsätze formuliert. Diese Grundsätze können von den Unternehmen als Leitlinie für die Integration von Sicherheit, Privatsphäre und Benutzbarkeit genutzt werden. Dabei werden die Grundsätze aus den Methoden und Empfehlungen der Literatur sowie den von den KMU eingesetzten Methoden extrapoliert. Die Grundsätze werden in das kombinierte Prozessmodell eingeordnet, welches sich aus der Beschreibung der Softwareentwicklungsprozesse durch die Interview-Teilnehmer ergibt.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>cryptolib: comparing and selecting cryptography libraries</title><link>/publication/2022-eicc-wohlwender-cryptolib/</link><pubDate>Fri, 06 May 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2022-eicc-wohlwender-cryptolib/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Selecting a library out of numerous candidates can be a laborious and resource-intensive task. We present the cryptolib index, a tool for decision-makers to choose the best fitting cryptography library for a given context. To define our index, 15 library attributes were synthesized from findings based on a literature review and interviews with decision-makers. These attributes were afterwards validated and weighted via an online survey. In order to create the index value for a given library, the individual attributes are assessed using given evaluation criteria associated with the respective attribute. As a proof of concept and to give a practical usage example, the derivation of the cryptolib values for the libraries BouncyCastle and Tink are shown in detail. Overall, by tailoring the weighting of the cryptolib attributes to their current use case, decision-makers are enabled to systematically select a cryptography library fitting best to their software project at hand in a guided, repeatable and reliable way.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Paper accepted at EICC 2022</title><link>/post/paper-eicc-2022/</link><pubDate>Thu, 05 May 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/paper-eicc-2022/</guid><description>&lt;p>Our paper &amp;ldquo;cryptolib: comparing and selecting cryptography libraries&amp;rdquo; by Jan Wohlwender, Rolf Huesmann, Andreas Heinemann and Alexander Wiesmaier will be presented at the &lt;a href="https://www.fvv.um.si/eicc2022/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference 2022&lt;/a> (EICC 2022) on June 15/16.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>This work is based on the results of Jan Wohlwender&amp;rsquo;s Master&amp;rsquo;s thesis. Jan completed his Master&amp;rsquo;s programme at the Department of Computer Science with a focus on IT security.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>8. Usable Security und Privacy Workshop (DE)</title><link>/post/muc-workshop-2022/</link><pubDate>Sat, 30 Apr 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/muc-workshop-2022/</guid><description>&lt;p>Am 04. Sept. 2022 findet der &lt;a href="https://das.h-brs.de/workshops/usp-muc-2022/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">8. Usable Security und Privacy Workshop&lt;/a> im Rahmen der &lt;a href="https://muc2022.mensch-und-computer.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Mensch und Computer 22&lt;/a> in Darmstadt statt. &lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/author/andreas-heinemann/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Andreas Heinemann&lt;/a> ist einer der Co-Organisatoren dieses Workshops.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>First Workshop of the EUT+ European Telecommunications and Networks Institute</title><link>/post/talk-eutplus-2022/</link><pubDate>Wed, 16 Mar 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/talk-eutplus-2022/</guid><description>&lt;p>On 15.03.2022 UCS took part in the first Workshop of the EUT+ European Telecommunications and Networks Institute.
The aim of this workshop was to offer an opportunity to all EUT+ partners to present their research activities related to Technologies and Services for Telecommunications.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>We contributed our research activities on PQC and network issues, especially the results of &lt;a href="/author/johanna-henrich/">Johanna&lt;/a>&amp;rsquo;s &lt;a href="/theses/2022-henrich/">master thesis&lt;/a>.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Performanz Evaluation von PQC in TLS 1.3 unter variierenden Netzwerkcharakteristiken</title><link>/theses/2022-henrich/</link><pubDate>Wed, 23 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/theses/2022-henrich/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>The used cryptographic primitives rely on the computational difficulty of certain mathematical problems. In the last years there has been much research on quantum computers which could be able to efficiently solve these problems in future years. Especially asymmetric primitives, used for authentication and key exchange could be broken. The affected algorithms are actually used within many internet protocols and applications and quantum-safe alternatives are urgently needed. NIST started a process to find and standardize quantum-safe digital signature schemes and key establishment schemes, but the candidates and alternatives come along with specific characteristics and differ from classical proceedings. So, besides analyzing the security of these new algorithms, it is also necessary to evaluate their performance and integrability into existing infrastructures and applications. Especially the integration into TLS protocol, used within about 90 percent of today&amp;rsquo;s internet connections, plays an important role. The current version 1.3 uses the threatened asymmetric primitives for both, digital signatures and key establishment.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>In this work, NIST candidates and alternatives for quantum-safe key establishment were evaluated while using them within TLS 1.3. The focus was on analyzing the performance trend while changing certain network parameters like rate or packetloss and examining the suitability of the PQC algorithms under different network scenarios and in the entire application context. To achieve this, the framework of &lt;a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44223-1_5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Paquin, Stebila, and Tamvada&lt;/a> was extended to emulate various network conditions while frequently establishing a TLS 1.3 connection and measuring handshake duration.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Among our key results, we observe that on the one hand the evaluated candidates Kyber, Saber and NTRU as well as the alternative NTRU Prime achieve very good overall performance and partially beat the classical ECDH. Choosing a higher security level or hybrid versions does not have a significant impact to the handshake times. On the other hand the alternatives FrodoKEM, HQC, SIKE and BIKE show individual disadvantages and the performance is linked to the used security level and variant. This applies in particular to FrodoKEM. SIKE seems to be a worthwhile alternative in specific circumstances, like rates less than 2 Mbps, due to its small key and ciphertext sizes. In general, network conditions should be taken into account while choosing the algorithm and parameter set. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the handshake performance dependents on numerous factors, like TCP mechanisms and MTU, which could compensate the disadvantages of PQC or make them obsolete.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Towards a maturity model for crypto-agility assessment</title><link>/publication/2022-preprint-hohm-camm/</link><pubDate>Mon, 14 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2022-preprint-hohm-camm/</guid><description>&lt;!-- Supplementary notes can be added here, including [code and math](https://sourcethemes.com/academic/docs/writing-markdown-latex/). --></description></item><item><title>CAMM presentation at it-sa 365 on March 15, 2022</title><link>/post/talk-itsa-2022/</link><pubDate>Fri, 11 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/post/talk-itsa-2022/</guid><description>&lt;h3 id="title">Title&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Towards a maturity model for crypto-agility assessment&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>The Crypto-Agility Maturity Model (CAMM for short), a maturity model for determining the crypto-agility of a particular software or IT landscape, is presented. CAMM consists of five levels, and for each level a set of requirements have been formulated based on existing crypto-agility literature that apply at that level. With the help of CAMM, organizations should be able to better prepare for potential threats that need to be addressed in a timely manner as vulnerabilities in cryptographic processes become known. The requirement for crypto-agility is motivated by the potential threat posed by powerful quantum computers.&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="date-and-format">Date and Format&lt;/h3>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>15.03.2022, 13:45h&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Online. Details at &lt;a href="https://www.itsa365.de/en/action-area/2022/it-security-talks-maerz/stream-i/ein-reifegradmodell-fuer-krypto-agilitaet-athene" target="_blank" rel="noopener">it-sa 365&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul></description></item><item><title>On the State of Crypto Agility</title><link>/publication/2022-bsi-alnahawi-crypto-agility/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Feb 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2022-bsi-alnahawi-crypto-agility/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Cryptographic primitives and protocols require constant modifications and adaptations in order to maintain the security of IT-systems. Many researchers argue that applying the notion of crypto-agility provides more feasible and practical updating of cryptographic systems, especially in the light of the expected transition to PQC. However, there is no unified definition for this notion, nor a common understanding of the requirements that can enable it. Moreover, it is not entirely clear what measures need to be taken in order to apply crypto-agility in practice, and which aspects and challenges exist towards this endeavor. We compare the various definitions of crypto-agility including its requirements and varying facets, and investigate the state of readiness of crypto-agility by surveying works dealing with general challenges and recommendations in this regard. We present the survey and discuss discovered challenges and solutions and utilize our findings to evaluate the state of readiness for crypto-agility.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>DemoQuanDT</title><link>/project/demoquandt/</link><pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/project/demoquandt/</guid><description>&lt;p>DemoQuanDT is an application-oriented research project to demonstrate and investigate quantum communication networks by establishing an entire QKD route within the German telecommunication network. Connecting Berlin and Bonn over a link distance of 923 km, the project includes all necessary components, systems, and processes for carrier-grade quantum key distribution.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The project addresses the growing threat that quantum computers pose to asymmetric cryptography used in everyday internet protocols. It investigates how to profitably combine Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) with Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and how to integrate both into existing communication protocols such as TLS. The overall objective is to develop reliable and usable protection against quantum computers, especially for critical infrastructures.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="partners">Partners&lt;/h2>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.telekom.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Deutsche Telekom&lt;/a> (Coordinator)&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.adesso.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">adesso SE&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.genua.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">genua GmbH&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.keequant.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">KEEQuant GmbH&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.h-da.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Hochschule Darmstadt – University of Applied Sciences&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.lmu.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;a href="https://www.aisec.fraunhofer.de" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Fraunhofer AISEC&lt;/a>&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>&lt;em>Funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).&lt;/em>&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>It is not as simple as that: Playing out password security trainings in order to nudge password changes</title><link>/publication/2021-eicc-sterk-notsimple/</link><pubDate>Thu, 11 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2021-eicc-sterk-notsimple/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>The COVID-19 pandemic forced a number of companies to place their staff into home office. In terms of security awareness measures, this means that content or training can only be played out remotely. Within this work, we report about a security awareness campaign focusing on password security that was carried out at a German mid-size company (2000 employees). We compare the effect of remotely played out training content on user behavior, i.e, on getting employees to change their password. The first content was directly embedded into an e-mail, the second was compiled on an intranet web page, and the third content was embedded into a video. Password changes were observed solely within the IT backend on the basis of events and timestamps generated by the company’s Active Directory service. For the campaign four representative samples (140 employees per sample) among the staff were selected and assigned to the different training contents. A fourth group served as a control group. During a period of 6 weeks, the content was played out two times. Unexpectedly, the measured password change rate observed was very low. Further, compared to the control group’s behavior, none of the different content formats played out led to significant more password changes. Clearly, the campaign failed according to its aim. Based on our observations, we provide several possible explanations for which there is some evidence from the literature.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Reifegradmodell für die Krypto-Agilität</title><link>/theses/2021-hohm/</link><pubDate>Tue, 26 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/theses/2021-hohm/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Quantum computers threaten to fundamentally endanger the security of cryptography used today. In addition to the development of algorithms that are resistant to attacks by quantum computers, crypto-agility is an important field of research in order to be able to exchange algorithms in time and thus be safer from the impending danger. Since there is no general guideline describing how crypto-agility should be implemented for IT systems, this thesis conducts a literature study and aggregates the requirements from existing research to develop a maturity model. The resulting model fulfills the properties identified as necessary to facilitate a crypto-agile system design. The evaluation and improvement of the crypto-agile properties are successfully tested on the example of a real system. Positive feedback from potential users of the model is collected in an initial expert survey. By gaining popularity and through extensive usage, this model supports further research into crypto-agility and ensures the future security of today’s infrastructure by enabling the simple exchange of existing cryptography with PQC methods.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>On the State of Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration</title><link>/publication/2021-informatik-alnahawi-migration/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Sep 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2021-informatik-alnahawi-migration/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Safeguarding current and future IT security from quantum computers implies more than the mere development of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Much work in this respect is currently being conducted, making it hard to keep track of the many individual challenges and respective solutions so far identified. In consequence, it is difficult to judge, whether all (known) challenges have been sufficiently addressed, and whether suitable solutions have been provided. We present results of a literature survey and discuss discovered challenges and solutions categorized into different areas and utilize our findings to evaluate the state of readiness for a full scale PQC migration. We use our findings as starting point to initiate an open community project in the form of a website to keep track of the ongoing efforts and the state of the art in PQC research. Thereby, we offer a single entry-point for the community into the subject reflecting the current state in a timely manner.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zur Integration von Post-Quantum Verfahren in bestehende Softwarepodukte</title><link>/publication/2021-bsi-zeier-pqc-integration/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2021-bsi-zeier-pqc-integration/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung">Zusammenfassung&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Aktuell werden PQC-Algorithmen standardisiert, um der aufziehenden Gefahr für
konventionelle asymmetrische Algorithmen durch Quantencomputer zu begegnen. Diese neuen
Algorithmen müssen dann in bestehende Protokolle, Applikationen und Infrastrukturen
eingebunden werden. Dabei ist mit Integrationsproblemen zu rechnen, die einerseits durch
Inkompatibilitäten mit existierenden Standards und Implementierungen begründet sind,
andererseits aber auch durch fehlendes Wissen der Softwareentwickler über die Handhabung
von PQC-Algorithmen zustande kommen. Um Inkompatibilitäten beispielhaft aufzuzeigen,
integrieren wir zwei unterschiedliche PQC-Algorithmen in zwei verschiedene bestehende
Softwareprodukte (InboxPager E-Mail Client und TLS Implementierung der Bouncy
Castle Bibliothek). Hierbei setzen wir auf die hoch-abstrahierende Krypto-Bibliothek
eUCRITE, die Entwicklern das Detailwissen über die korrekte Verwendung klassischer und
PQC-Algorithmen abnimmt und damit bereits einige potentielle Implementierungsfehler
vermeidet. Die dabei zutage getretenen Probleme bestätigen teilweise bereits bekannte
Inkompatibilitäten, beinhalten aber auch neue, bisher nicht angesprochene Schwierigkeiten.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Bewertung der Relevanz von Krypto-APIs auf Basis eines Scoring-Ansatzes</title><link>/theses/2021-wohlwender/</link><pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/theses/2021-wohlwender/</guid><description>&lt;p>The main results of the work will be presented at the European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference - EICC 2022.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>For detais see our upcoming paper: &lt;a href="/publication/2022-eicc-wohlwender-cryptolib/">cryptolib: comparing and selecting cryptography libraries&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Technological advancement and ongoing digitalization are creating more and more security-critical requirements for software developers. At the same time there is a big and ever-growing amount of cryptographic APIs. Identifying why certain APIs are used more frequently than others is not an easy task.
Furthermore, it is difficult to recognize the reasons behind the utilization of an certain API in software development.
Which APIs are relevant and important for developers? Which attributes are involved?
There are a couple of scientific contributions that analyze APIs or introduce attributes under different points of view at the time of writing. The new attributes, that have been introduced within this thesis, are following the known literature.
This thesis evaluates related work for useful attributes and conducts interviews to generate new attributes for the creation of a new Scoring. The Scoring is based on 15 new attributes condensed from 78 attributes from related work and 50 attributes from interviews. The new Scoring is set up with related descriptions and information for valuating APIs. The chosen at- tributes have been evaluated, with regard to their suitability, by conducting a survey. Additionally, the scoring was used on two APIs as an example to show the rating in action.
This thesis established suitable attributes for the rating of cryptographic APIs, that have been analyzed and tested. From those, a scoring was developed, that can be used as a decision support for developers. By using the scoring, existing APIs may be indexed and added to a ranking. Thus, from now on, relevant APIs may be identified and compared.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>IT-Sicherheit aus Nutzerinnen- und Nutzersicht</title><link>/publication/2021-nomons-margraf-usec/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2021-nomons-margraf-usec/</guid><description/></item><item><title>Software Development Processes for ADs, SMCs and OSCs supporting Usability, Security, and Privacy Goals - an Overview</title><link>/publication/2021-ares-bender-sdp/</link><pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2021-ares-bender-sdp/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Software applications should be secure, usable and privacy-friendly. However, recurring headlines about data leaks in applications show that it is not so easy to develop software that meets these three challenges. Studies show that it is better to think about these challenges during a software development process. Many ideas and approaches exist in the research community that define these challenges as goals within a software development process. In addition, major companies have published their own software development processes and methods addressing these goals in part. But major companies have very different work conditions compared to a work setting faced by an App-Developer (AD), a Small and Medium Company (SMC) and the Open Source Community (OSC) respectively. This leads us to the question: Are work settings of ADs, SMCs, or the OSCs considered sufficiently by research in order to make software development processes with special focus on security, usability and privacy goals work? Therefore we performed a literature review in order to investigate the current state of research. Using an appropriate query, publications relevant for our question were identified and categorised by two independent reviewers.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>Our work shows that there are some publications proposing software processes supporting usability goals and taking work settings into account. We were not able to identify any contribution that proposes a software development process which addresses privacy, usability and security goals together and differentiates the work setting of ADs or as found in SMCs and in OSCs respectively.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>PQC Integration</title><link>/project/pqc/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/project/pqc/</guid><description>&lt;p>Asymmetric cryptography, which is widely used everyday for authentication and key exchange in communication protocols, is threatened by the ongoing development of Quantum-Computers. Quantum Computers have the potential to defeat the security of classical algorithms like RSA or ECDH and break the underlying mathematical problems within the next view years. To further ensure security, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a process in 2016 to find novel, quantum-resistant algorithms (PQC) for execution on classical computers, equivalent to the classical ones. These novel algorithms have to be accessable to software-developers as well as beeing tested and integrated into existing software.&lt;/p>
&lt;p>The PQC-Integration-Project develops concepts for easy and safe integration of quantum-safe cryptography with a focus on crypto-agility. Further research aspects are performance in real-world applications, usability &amp;ndash; including safe and easy to use API&amp;rsquo;s, as well as concepts to migrate large infrastructures.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zur Benutzbarkeit und Verwendung von API-Dokumentationen</title><link>/publication/2020-muc-huesmann-api/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2020-muc-huesmann-api/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung">Zusammenfassung&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Eine gute Dokumentation ist essenziell für eine gute Benutzbarkeit von (Sicherheits-)APIs, d.h. insbesondere für die korrekte Verwendung der APIs. Anforderungen an eine gute Dokumentation von APIs wurden in mehreren Arbeiten beschrieben, jedoch gibt es bislang keine technische Umsetzung (im folgenden Dokumentationssystem genannt), welche diese Anforderungen umsetzt. Die Anforderungen lassen sich unterteilen in Anforderungen an das Dokumentationssystem und Anforderungen an den Dokumentationsinhalt. Aus 13 identifizierten Anforderungen an ein Dokumentationssystem selbst wurden im Rahmen dieser Arbeit 9 in einen Prototypen umgesetzt und in einer Nutzerstudie mit 22 Probanden unter Verwendung einer kryptografischen API evaluiert. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass die Umsetzung der Anforderung Schnelle Nutzung der API ermöglichen zum einen wesentlich von der Qualität der eingepflegten Inhalte abhängt, zum anderen aber auch 5 weitere der betrachteten Anforderungen bzw. deren Umsetzungen subsumiert. Die zwei weiteren umgesetzten Anforderungen (Klassische Referenz und Rückfragen und Kommentarfunktion) wurden von den Probanden kaum oder nicht eingesetzt. Deren Nützlichkeit und Relevanz sollte in einer Langzeitstudie untersucht werden.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>API Usability of Stateful Signature Schemes</title><link>/publication/2019-iwsec-zeier-api/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2019-iwsec-zeier-api/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>The rise of quantum computers poses a threat to asymmetric cryptographic schemes. With their continuing development, schemes such as DSA or ECDSA are likely to be broken in a few years’ time. We therefore must begin to consider the use of different algorithms that would be able to withstand powerful quantum computers. Among the considered algorithms are hash-based signature schemes, some of which, including XMSS, are stateful. In comparison to stateless algorithms, these stateful schemes pose additional implementation challenges for developers, regarding error-free usage and integration into IT systems. As the correct use of cryptographic algorithms is the foundation of a secure IT system, mastering these challenges is essential.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Datenschutz muss benutzbar sein</title><link>/publication/2019-dud-heinemann-datenschutz/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2019-dud-heinemann-datenschutz/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung">Zusammenfassung&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Mit der EU-Datenschutzgrundverordnung sind die Rechte der betroffenen Person ausgeweitet und gestärkt worden. Diese Rechte bilden ein zentrales Prinzip des Datenschutzrechts, indem sie die Selbstkontrolle bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten ermöglichen. Es ist jedoch zu befürchten, dass Betroffene ihre Rechte in der Praxis nicht wahrnehmen, sofern dies nicht in einfacher Weise geschehen kann. In diesem Beitrag wird vorgeschlagen, die Erkenntnisse aus dem Forschungsgebiet Usable Security and Privacy anzuwenden, um zu benutzerfreundlichen Lösungen für den Datenschutz zu kommen. Dazu wird aufgezeigt, wie in diesem Gebiet diskutierte Konzepte helfen können, den mit den Betroffenenrechten verbundenen Herausforderungen zu begegnen.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Eigenschaften optimierter API-Dokumentationen im Entwicklungsprozess sicherer Software</title><link>/publication/2019-muc-huesmann-apidoc/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2019-muc-huesmann-apidoc/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung">Zusammenfassung&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Hersteller herausgegebenen offiziellen Dokumentationen von Sicherheits-APIs zu lesen. Hingegen bevorzugen sie informelle Dokumentationen, wie sie zum Beispiel auf Q&amp;amp;A Plattformen wie Stack Overflow zu finden sind. Allerdings enthalten Codebeispiele solcher Quellen des Internets oft falschen bzw. aus Sicht der IT-Sicherheit unsicheren Code, welcher oft unreflektiert übernommen wird und letztendlich zu unsicheren Applikationen führt. Diese Arbeit untersucht, welche Eigenschaften eine Dokumentation aus Sicht der Entwickler haben sollte, um sie bei der Erstellung von sicherem Code zu unterstützen. Dazu wurden insgesamt 26 Programmierer in sieben Fokusgruppen über die Vor- und Nachteile beispielhafter, gängiger Dokumentationsarten von APIs befragt. Abschließend wurden die Teilnehmer gebeten, Eigenschaften einer aus ihrer Sicht optimierten API-Dokumentation zu beschreiben. Herausgestellt hat sich, dass eine optimierte Dokumentation viele Beispiele haben sollte. Sie sollte gut strukturiert, durchsuchbar und bei Google leicht auffindbar sein. Weitere wichtige Funktionen wären: Ein Bereich mit Tutorials, eine klassische Referenz und Videos für den schnellen Überblick. Zu jedem Themenbereich sollte es die Möglichkeit für Fragen, Antworten und Diskussionen geben. Durch ein Bewertungssystem sollten gute Lösungen aus der Diskussion in die Beispiele einfließen können. Weiter konnte anhand der Antworten der Probanden ein Interaktionsmuster identifiziert werden, welches das Zusammenspiel der einzelnen Teile einer optimierten API-Dokumentation beschreibt. Auf Basis dieser Erkenntnisse soll in einem nächsten Schritt ein Prototyp entwickelt und seine Wirksamkeit hinsichtlich der Unterstützung im Softwareentwicklungsprozess von sicherheitskritischen Anwendungen evaluiert werden.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Phishing Attack Recognition by End-Users: Concepts for URL Visualization and Implementation</title><link>/publication/2019-haisa-erbenich-phish/</link><pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2019-haisa-erbenich-phish/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Social engineering, through means of phishing, is a very popular entry point for a targeted attack in order to obtain further data on a company or private individual, e.g. by injecting malware on the victim’s machine. A phishing attack that leads to a malicious website can usually be identified by the HTTP link with expert knowledge. However, only very few users pay attention to the link or have the necessary knowledge to recognize a threat as such. This work addresses the question of how current link visualization could be improved so that a user can better identify whether the link points to a phishing site or a legitimate site. Additionally, we also address the question of how our proposed link concepts can be put into practice. As an improvement, the outer shape of a link will be adapted by content-based formatting, trimming and other features. The user will thus be able to interactively explore a URL and its components in order to gain a better decision. As a next step, we plan to evaluate our concepts in a controlled lab environment with few test persons as well as by a large-scale online user-study.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Benutzbarkeit von zustandsbehafteten, Hash-basierten Signaturverfahren</title><link>/theses/2018-zeier/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Nov 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/theses/2018-zeier/</guid><description>&lt;!-- Supplementary notes can be added here, including [code and math](https://sourcethemes.com/academic/docs/writing-markdown-latex/). -->
&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Quantum computers pose a danger to asymmetric cryptographic schemes. As development continues, schemes such as RSA will likely be broken in a few years’ time. For this reason, different algorithms that would also withstand powerful quantum computers are already being considered today. One class of such algorithms are hash-based signature schemes, some of which, including XMSS, are stateful. This leads to additional challenges for error-free use and integration in IT systems by developers. However, the security of IT systems depends on the correct use of cryptographic algorithms. This thesis therefore proposes a usable API design for stateful signature schemes using XMSS/XMSSMT as an example. This design was developed through a series of interviews with software developers, prototypically implemented and evaluated in further user studies. It was shown that the API can manage the stateful key in a way that is transparent to the user. However, this leads to many of the study’s participants not being aware of using stateful schemes. Regarding the documentation and applicability of the API, good results could be achieved.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Impressum / Imprint</title><link>/terms/</link><pubDate>Thu, 28 Jun 2018 00:00:00 +0100</pubDate><guid>/terms/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="information-in-accordance-with--5-ddg">Information in accordance with § 5 DDG&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Prof. Dr. Andreas Heinemann&lt;br>
c/o&lt;br>
Fachbereich Informatik&lt;br>
Hochschule Darmstadt - University of Applied Sciences&lt;br>
Schöfferstr. 3&lt;br>
D-64295 Darmstadt&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="represented-by">Represented by&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Prof. Dr. Andreas Heinemann&lt;/p>
&lt;h3 id="contact">Contact&lt;/h3>
&lt;p>Tel: +49 6151 533 68482&lt;br>
E-Mail: andreas DOT heinemann AT h-da DOT de&lt;br>
Web: &lt;a href="https://ucs.h-da.de/author/andreas-heinemann" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://ucs.h-da.de/author/andreas-heinemann&lt;/a>&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="person-responsible-for-content-in-accordance-with--18-abs-2-mstv">Person responsible for content in accordance with § 18 Abs. 2 MStV&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Andreas Heinemann&lt;/p>
&lt;!-- Indication of source for images and graphics -->
&lt;p>Originators of the team member photos:&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>Johanna Henrich, Hochschule Darmstadt&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Nicolai Schmitt, Hochschule Darmstadt&lt;/li>
&lt;li>Sven Wroblewski, Hochschule Darmstadt&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;h2 id="disclaimer">Disclaimer&lt;/h2>
&lt;h3 id="accountability-for-content">Accountability for content&lt;/h3>
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&lt;p>Responsibility for the content of external links (to web pages of third parties) lies solely with the operators of the linked pages. No violations were evident to us at the time of linking. Should any legal infringement become known to us, we will remove the respective link immediately.&lt;/p>
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&lt;p>This web pages and their contents are subject to German copyright law. Unless expressly permitted by law (§ 44a et seq. of the copyright law), every form of utilizing, reproducing or processing works subject to copyright protection on our web pages requires the prior consent of the respective owner of the rights. Individual reproductions of a work are allowed only for private use, so must not serve either directly or indirectly for earnings. Unauthorized utilization of copyrighted works is punishable (§ 106 of the copyright law).&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Auf dem Weg zu sicheren abgeleiteten Identitäten mit Payment Service Directive 2</title><link>/publication/2018-sicherheit-trader-psd2/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2018 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2018-sicherheit-trader-psd2/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung">Zusammenfassung&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Online-Dienste erfordern eine eindeutige Identifizierung der Benutzer und somit eine sichere Authentisierung. Insbesondere eGovernment-Dienste innerhalb der EU erfordern eine starke Absicherung der Benutzeridentität. Auch die mobile Nutzung solcher Dienste wird bevorzugt. Das Smartphone kann hier als einer der Faktoren für eine Zwei-Faktor-Authentifizierung dienen, um eine höhere Sicherheit zu erreichen. Diese Arbeit schlägt vor, den Zugang und die Nutzung einer abgeleiteten Identität mit einem Smartphone zu sichern, um es dem Benutzer zu ermöglichen, sich auf sichere Weise gegenüber einem Online-Dienst zu identifizieren. Dazu beschreiben wir ein Schema zur Ableitung der Identität eines Benutzers mithilfe eines Account Servicing Payment Service Provider (ASPSP) unter Verwendung der Payment Service Directive 2 (PSD2) der Europäischen Union. PSD2 erfordert eine Schnittstelle für Dritte, die von ASPSPs implementiert werden muss. Diese Schnittstelle wird genutzt, um auf die beim ASPSP gespeicherten Kontoinformationen zuzugreifen und daraus die Identität des Kontoinhabers abzuleiten. Zur Sicherung der abgeleiteten Identität ist der Einsatz von FIDO (Fast Identity Online) vorgesehen. Wir bewerten unseren Vorschlag anhand der Richtlinien von eIDAS LoA (Level of Assurance) und zeigen, dass für die meisten Bereiche das Vertrauensniveau substantiell erreicht werden kann. Um diesem Level vollständig gerecht zu werden, ist zusätzlicher Arbeitsaufwand erforderlich: Zunächst ist es erforderlich, Extended Validation-Zertifikate für alle Institutionen zu verwenden. Zweitens muss der ASPSP sichere TAN-Methoden verwenden. Schließlich kann derWiderruf einer abgeleiteten Identität nicht erfolgen, wenn der Benutzer keinen Zugriff auf sein Smartphone hat, das mit der abgeleiteten ID verknüpft ist. Daher ist ein anderes Widerrufsverfahren erforderlich (z. B. eine Support-Hotline).&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Alle reden über Blockchain</title><link>/publication/2017-dud-grimm-block/</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2017-dud-grimm-block/</guid><description/></item><item><title>Design and Implementation Aspects of Mobile Derived Identities</title><link>/publication/2017-oid-trader-ids/</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2017-oid-trader-ids/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract">Abstract&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>With the ongoing digitalisation of our everyday tasks, more and more eGovernment services make it possible for citizens to take care of their administrative obligations online. This type of services requires a certain assurance level for user authentication. To meet these requirements, a digital identity issued to the citizen is essential. Nowadays, due to the widespread use of smartphones, mobile user authentication is often favoured. This naturally supports two-factor authentication schemes (2FA). We use the term mobile derived identity to stress two aspects: a) the identity is enabled for mobile usage and b) the identity is somehow derived from a physical or digital proof of identity. This work reviews 21 systems and publications that support mobile derived identities. One subset of the considered systems is already in place (public or private sector in Europe), another subset is subject to research. Our goal is to identify prevalent design and implementation aspects for these systems in order to gain a better understanding on best practises and common views on mobile derived identities. We found, that research prefers storing identity data on the mobile device itself whereas real world systems usually rely on cloud storage. 2FA is common in both worlds, however biometrics as second factor is the exception.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zur Wirksamkeit von Security-Awareness-Maßnahmen</title><link>/publication/2017-dach-security-schembre/</link><pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2017-dach-security-schembre/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="zusammenfassung">Zusammenfassung&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Im Rahmen einer elfwöchigen Studie bei einem mittelständigen Unternehmen wurde untersucht, ob das Investment in ein Präsenztraining zur Verbesserung der Security Awareness mit Fokus auf E-Mail-Phishing-Angriffe lohnenswert ist. Das erstellte Präsenztraining wird mit kostengünstig erwerbbaren Online-Lernspielen verglichen. Die Auswertung der Daten zeigt, dass beide Maßnahmen sich positiv auf das Verhalten der Mitarbeiter auswirken, jedoch die Verbesserungen durch das Präsenztraining überwiegen. Hierbei ist auffällig, dass bei einer freiwilligen Teilnahme die Motivation, eigenständig ein Online-Lernspiel zu absolvieren, sehr gering ist. Bemerkenswert ist ebenfalls, dass allein das Versenden von fingierten Phishing-E-Mails zu einer Sensibilisierung der Mitarbeiter führt.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Usability-Untersuchung eines Papierprototypen für eine mobile Online-Ausweisfunktion des Personalausweises</title><link>/publication/2016-gi-kostic-paper/</link><pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2016-gi-kostic-paper/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abtract-german">Abtract (german)&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Die Online-Ausweisfunktion des Personalausweises in Deutschland besitzt eine Reihe von Usability-Schwierigkeiten und somit eine geringe Akzeptanz bei den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern. Die Umsetzung des Personalausweises in Form einer App auf einem Smartphone könnte hier Abhilfe schaffen. Mithilfe eines Papierprototypen wurden erste Usabilty-Untersuchungen durchgeführt, die zeigen, dass zwar die Benutzbarkeit der App gegeben ist, das Vertrauen in die Sicherheitsfunktionen der App jedoch nicht.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>AnonDrop - Räumlich begrenzte anonyme Informationsverbreitung</title><link>/publication/2016-dach-security-zeier/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Sep 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2016-dach-security-zeier/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract-german">Abstract (german)&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Opportunistische Netze bieten ein alternatives Kommunikationssystem in Situationen, in denen ein repressiver Staat die klassische Internetkommunikation filtert oder ganz unterbindet. AnonDrop erlaubt hier eine räumlich begrenzte Kommunikation, die mittels dynamischer Netzadressen (MAC und IP) und weiterer Schutzmaßnahmen Angriffen auf die Identifizierung von Knoten überwiegend standhält. Auf Basis von Android Smartphones wurde ein Prototyp realisiert, der bei ersten Last- und Mobilitätstests zufriedenstellende Ergebnisse zeigt.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Security-Management-as-a-Service für die öffentliche Verwaltung</title><link>/publication/2016-dach-security-secmgt/</link><pubDate>Tue, 27 Sep 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2016-dach-security-secmgt/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract-german">Abstract (german)&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt einen Ansatz vor, der kommunale Behörden bei der Etablierung eines ganzheitlichen IT-Sicherheitsprozesses und dessen Aufrechterhaltung im laufenden Betrieb unterstützt. Die wesentliche Idee besteht darin, derzeit umgesetzte organisatorische Sicherheitsmaßnahmen in Technische umzuwandeln, die wiederum durch einen zentralen Dienst ausgelagert werden können. Der zur Verfügung gestellte, zentrale Dienst soll die Kommune ebenfalls bei der Etablierung eines Informations- sicherheitsmanagementsystems unterstützen. Um die Anforderungen an einen solchen zentralen Dienst formulieren zu können, wurden die IT-Infrastrukturen in verschiedenen kommunalen Bürgerämtern untersucht. Des Weiteren wurden Mitarbeiter befragt und bei der Durchführung ihrer Aufgaben beobachtet. Basierend auf diesen Untersuchungen wurden Hauptprobleme, die zu Sicherheitsvorfällen führen können, erhoben und zusammengefasst. Darauf aufbauend wird ein erster Lösungsvorschlag für die Konzeption und Einbindung des zentralen Dienstes diskutiert.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Zur Benutzbarkeit der AusweisApp2</title><link>/publication/2016-muc-willomitzer-ausweisapp2/</link><pubDate>Sun, 04 Sep 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>/publication/2016-muc-willomitzer-ausweisapp2/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="abstract-german">Abstract (german)&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>Die Akzeptanz und Nutzung der Online-Ausweisfunktion des deutschen Personalausweises liegt hinter den Erwartungen zurück. Sie verlangte in der Vergangenheit vom Anwender den Einsatz der AusweisApp, die eine Reihe von Usability-Schwächen zeigt. Aus diesem Grund wurde bei der Neuentwicklung des Nachfolgers &amp;ndash; der AusweisApp2 &amp;ndash; auf den frühzeitigen und stetigen Einbezug des Anwenders geachtet. Im Rahmen von entwicklungsbegleitenden Usability-Untersuchungen konnten so frühzeitig Schwächen identifiziert und für die finale Version der AusweisApp2 eliminiert werden. Es zeigt sich jedoch auch, dass schwerwiegende Usability-Schwächen erst in der Interaktion des Gesamtsystems (Personalausweis, Kartenleser, AusweisApp2, Browser, Diensteanbieter) zum Vorschein treten und nicht durch die AusweisApp2 allein, sondern nur in der Betrachtung des Gesamtsystems zu lösen sind.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>